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A NO-FRILLS LOOK AT THE CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
or
HOW POLITICIANS AND LAWYERS HIDE
REALITY
H.J. Glasbeek*
The proponents of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms are
fighting a mighty battle to show that, despite what are disap-
pointing results from their perspective, judicial review can, and
wil be used to advance the causes of the disadvantaged and
democracy. This forces them to make a series of incoherent and
implausible arguments to rationalize what, to them, seem to be
inconsistent and capricious decisions. Yet, if the Charter is put
in its true political economic context, the courts look better. They
turn out to be focussed and rational in their attempts to attain
the objectives which that context demands. But, those objectives
are not the protection of the underclasses or the perfection of
democracy. The historical function of the judiciary has been to
protect the status quo. The Charter was not meant to alter this.
Armed with it, Canadian courts are better equipped than ever
to protect the dominant classes.
Un coup d'oeil s6rieux sur la Charte des droits et
libert~s, ou Comment les politiciens et les avocats
cachent la realite
Les champions de la Charte des droits et libert6s luttent
vaillamment pour prouver que, malgr des resultats decevants
de leur point de vue, le contrble judiciaire peut tre utilisg pour
promouvoir la cause des ddfavoriss et de la democratie, et qu 'il
la promouvra reellement. Cette croyance les force a avancer une
suite d'arguments incohrents et peu plausibles pour justifuer des
jugements qui leur semblent inconsistants et capricieux. Mais on
n'a qu'& replacer la Charte dans son contexte politique et
economique viritable, et les tribunaux paraissent alors sous un
meilleur jour: on voit alors qu 'ils se concentrent sur une tentative
rationnelle d'atteindre les objectifs exiggs par ce contexte - qui
ne sont point la protection des pauvres ou le perfectionnement
de la ddmocratie. En effet, la fonction du pouvoir judiciaire a
toujours tg de proteger le statu quo; la Charte n 'a pas 9t9 confue
pour changer cela Arm,4s de ce document, les cours canadiennes
sont encore mieux en mesure de prot~ger les classes dominantes.
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
This paper was originally presented as the seventh Annual Lecture in the
Distinguished Scholars Programme on Access to Justice at the University of
Windsor, February 22, 1989.
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I. Introduction
An alternative title for this article could have been: A Real Rogues'
Charter.
The Rogues' Charter was, of course, the characterization the Law
Times' gave to the legislation which bestowed legal personality
upon companies whose investors' responsibility would be limited
to the extent of their financial investment. While the development
of capitalist relations of productions had made it a logical necessity
to adapt the structure of the earlier joint stock corporations so that
the accumulation and consolidation of many small capitals could
be promoted, some pristine capitalists and liberal philosophers were
appalled by the idea that people who might create harm to others
- particularly to creditors - would be shielded from personal
responsibility if their investment in the company did not cover the
liability incurred by the company. This ran counter to their precepts
of what a free market should be and to their idea of individuals
as sovereign responsible actors. Their fear was that precisely the
wrong kind of people would be inveigled into participating in market
activity through the corporate form, people who did not have the
moral fibre to help them understand their social as well as their
legal obligations. As a result, it was thought possible that the very
public welfare sought to be promoted by the creation of the new
legal device - the company as a legal person with limited liability
- would not be achieved. Worse still, harm might be inflicted
by irresponsibly run companies and the wrong people would reap
the benefits of the availability of this new legal instrument.2 Many
observers, including me, would argue that these nineteenth century
anxieties have turned out to be all too well-founded. Shareholders
seldom assume responsibility for, and are seldom asked to bear
the burden of, the serious economic, physical and environmental
harm done by corporations in their pursuit of profit. Similarly, all
too often the corporate form is used by individuals who think it
will help them avoid the incidents of socially imposed responsi-
bilities, such as the obligations arising under welfare and compen-
sation schemes or the costs associated with minimum employment
standard schemes. 3
I The Law Times, 21 June, 1856.
2 The idea that there were 'right and wrong' kinds of people stemmed, of
course, from the notion that, initially, only leading men were worthy of being
the recipients of charters issued by the Crown to undertake adventures (such
as those of the Hudson's Bay Company and the South Sea Company), as
only they could be trusted to discharge the public responsibilities associated
with these ventures. Thus it was appropriate for them to be richly rewarded
if profits were made as a result of their acceptance of the obligations entailed
in these quasi-public undertakings. The idea of seeking investment from the
population at large, while one of the stated aims of the English companies'
legislation of 1855, raised alarm among many of the leaders of a society
still shot through with notions of noblesse oblige.
3 For an elaboration, see H.J. Glasbeek, "The Corporate Social Responsibility
Movement - The Latest in Maginot Lines to Save Capitalism" (1988), 11
DaL H.LJ. 363. Equating the Rogues' Charter and the Charter of Rights
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So it is with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It has structural
features which permit it to be used for purposes which differ sharply
from those from which its proponents believe it was meant to be
used. In particular, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms may lead
to the abdication of the promotion of social good by those who
should be held responsible for it - elected people and voters -
and may be used for the benefit of those very kind of people who
ought, given the stated purposes of the Charter, not to be able to
use it at all - wealthy non-persons. Here I note that I chose the
Rogues' Charter as a metaphor precisely because the very entities
who obtained most of the advantages offered by that original Rogues'
Charter are the ones who are likely to benefit most from the social
irresponsibility induced by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.4
In this paper I try to say why this has happened and will continue
to happen. The argument is that if attention is paid (i), to the weakness
of the basic arguments offered in support of the entrenchment of
the Charter (ii), to the entrenchment process itself and (iii), to the
outcomes of Charter of Rights and Freedoms' litigation, it will be
seen how it has disappointed, and will continue to disappoint, those
who expect social improvement and progress from the new con-
stitutional guarantee of rights and freedoms.
I will begin by showing that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
has been sold as if it were a consumer product, a selling job which
continues to this very day. Part of that selling is as misleading
as most advertising is. In part it relies on assertions and assumptions
about the qualities and nature of the judges and of the judiciary
and Freedoms in this way requires some qualification. The apprehensions
created under the Rogues Charter and our constitutional one both had their
origins, in part, in the fact that there was a qualitative change in the nature
of decision-makers. But, those changes, on the surface, seemed to be of a
different order. It is the argument in this paper that, qualitatively (cs.
quantitatively), the fears based on the changes in decision-making power,
were founded on the same premise: the danger of increased unaccountability.
Under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, decision-makers in whom we
felt we could place some trust because they were accountable to us (i.e.
elected representatives) are to be replaced by decision-makers who are not
personally accountable to us in the same, direct way (i.e. judges), although
they command at least as much public respect as did the investors who
bottomed ships in the early joint stock companies adventures. Compare this
to the developments in corporate law, referred to above, as a result of which
it was feared that a small number of identifiable adventurers who could
be counted on to be responsible for their acts were to be replaced by thousands
of faceless, only marginally accountable, investors. In the nineteenth century,
the fact of a multitude of shareholders with limited responsibility inculcated
the apprehension; in the Charter setting it is the well-known and respected
few, with limited responsibility, who raise the spectre of a threat to the public
welfare. How judges can be both respected individuals and irresponsible for
their actions is the focus of much of the argument which follows.
4 The indication that this might be so came early; see, P. Monahan, Politics
and the Constitution. The Charter, Federalism and the Supreme Court of Canada
(1987), ch. 3; W.L. Morton, "Charting the Charter - Year One; A Statistical
Analysis" (1984-85), 2 Can H. Rts. YB., 239.
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as an institution. These arguments are often misconceived. A second
section of this paper will concentrate on the structure of the Charter
itself. The point made is that the Charter sets out to protect many
kinds of rights and freedoms and that to fail to differentiate between
them leads to distorted analysis and understanding. In particular,
it is this which permits the very actors who ought not to benefit
from the Charter's guarantees to use it with great success. Further,
it will be argued that this failure to differentiate between the types
of rights and freedoms in the Charter is associated with an historical
approach to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This lack of
historical perspective when interpreting and applying the Charter
makes it much less useful than its proponents argue it will be because
the vast bulk of the Canadian population is constituted by people
who are disadvantaged by their history. Then I will raise the idea
that the kind of Charter of Rights and Freedoms we got was a
functional response to some of the difficulties created by a newly
emerging set of political-economic circumstances and that this limits
the possibilities of the Charter. The conclusion I reach is that the
Charter is, at best, yet one more accommodative measure which
erects barriers hindering the furtherance of democracy in Canada.5
II. The Selling of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
What follows is a summary of the arguments made in support
of the entrenchment of rights and freedoms in a constitutional
document. It is a no-frills presentation and, therefore, leaves out
many of the sophisticated and nuanced arguments made by the
theoreticians engrossed in the vigorous political and intellectual
debate which the Charter has spawned.6 But the no-frills approach
is not, I believe, distorting of the main arguments on offer. They
are to the following effect:
(i) There are certain rights and freedoms which are fundamental
to Canadians which they must be able to enjoy without hindrance
if individuals are to lead a sovereign, dignified existence, free from
unwonted fetters;
(ii) As the untrammelled exercise of rights and freedoms will lead,
inevitably, to collisions between different actors with varying
priorities, capacities and impulses, constraints will have to be
imposed on some actors and some activities. These restraints may
take the form of legal duties and obligations created by the evolution
5 For an account of Canada's historically rather lukewarm attitude to demo-
cracy, see P. Resnick, Parliament vs People, An Essay on Democracy and
Canadian Political Culture (1984).
6 The study of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is one of the few real growth
industries in Canada. It outstrips, by far, the spurt of activity that law and
economics scholarship spawned about a decade or so ago in the U.S.A and
Canada. The Legal Resource Index, provided by Information Access Com-
pany, lists 483 entries indicating that a note or an article on the Charter
has appeared in a journal included in the index (up to January 1989).
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of judge-made rules7 or be the results of legislatively enacted norms
of behaviour;
(iii) In either case, the law-makers may go too far. It is essential
to the model that all individuals must be given as much liberty
of action as possible. Hence, the fettering of the fundamental rights
and freedoms of any individual to safeguard the rights and freedoms
of others must be undertaken with great caution;
(iv) In the immediate past, that is, pre-Charter, the institution
ultimately entrusted with the decision as to how much intervention
with individuals' fundamental rights and freedoms could be tolerated
was the legislature. It was deemed to be the sovereign institution.
It could impose any rules it liked in respect of any subject-matter
which was defined as being within its jurisdiction, provided always
that the legislature followed the appropriate forms laid down for
rule-making. The formal, legal constraints on the legislature, then,
were jurisdictional and procedural. The arbiter of whether the
legislature had violated these constraints was another branch of
the state - the judiciary. Courts were not to pronounce on the
contents and nature of the norms of behaviour sought to be imposed
by the legislature. The courts did have some discretion in this regard,
however, because, very often, there would be room for argument
as to precisely what the legislature's jurisdictional authority was
or what it was that a legislature had meant when it enacted a
particular statute or created a particular agency. The courts'
interpretative powers thus had given them some content-regulating
power. But, it was the conventional understanding that this was
a subterranean way of attacking the sovereignty of legislation: the
power to alter the content and nature of legislatively-made law
was not part of the judiciary's brief.8
7 As this is a 'no frills' approach to the Charter and the legal system, I will
not address the hoary argument that courts do not make law, that they merely
find it and apply it to the neutrally-found facts as arising from the evidence
put before them. This is not a serious argument. I teach torts. Anyone who
has read, say, Donoghue v. Stevenson, [19321 A.C. 562 (H.L.), Hedley, Byrne
& Co. Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.), Lumley v. Gye
(1853), 2 E & B. 216 or Cook v. Lewis, [1951] S.C.R. 830 (S.C.C.), should
not be able to make the argument that courts do not make law and/or choose
facts and maintain a straight face at the same time. I will return to the
courts' continued ability to exercise the manipulative powers which inhere
in the judicial exercise when they apply the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
8 The argument here is a conceptual one. As the text notes, I am well aware
that courts have manipulative tools - from the finding of facts through
the selective use of rhetoric and precedent - which enable them to dismember
legislation when they do not like its substance. That is, their power to
undermine legislative authority has always been great. The significant point
here, however, is that the courts have had to justify such activity by resorting
to the claim that they were engaging in jurisdictional or procedural review
or by assertions that they were merely using neutral techniques of interpretation
of language. It is difficult to think of better evidence than this for the proposition
that the supremacy of the legislature had been an accepted, indeed, embedded,
legal and social artefact.
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Furthermore, inasmuch as the courts upheld, enforced and created
duties and obligations at common law, their rulings could be
overturned by a legislature. This was done, and continues to be
done, with some regularity. Indeed, pre-Charter, an essential com-
ponent of our claim to be a democracy had been the argument
that the final arbiter of what were the legal rights and duties of
individuals in our society was the elected legislature, rather than
any unelected body, even if it were as august an institution as the
judiciary;
(v) Even though, in theory, a legislature had the de jure power
to enact any law it liked within its jurisdictional authority, it was
fettered by political understandings; there were non-legally binding
conventions. In modern, pre-Charter, Canada this had come to mean
that the legislature would have found it very difficult to abolish,
by procedurally correctly passed legislation, the universal franchise
and the normal electoral processes, in particular the rights of groups
of citizens to form opposition parties. Amongst the many important
conventions which it was understood legislators had to accord
respect were the following: (i), that individuals should be able to
use their property as they liked (ii), to believe in whatever they
liked (iii), to abide by the religious tenets they preferred (iv), to
associate with whomever they liked (v), to speak freely about any
matter at all (or not to speak at all) (vi), to assemble for peaceful
purposes, etc. While legislation could limit the scope of these spheres
of political activity, legislators who did impose such fetters were
expected to provide justifying reasons, acceptable to right-thinking
people. Nonetheless, it was the legislature which could decide what
would be acceptable to right-thinking people. The real limitation
on legislative power to curb such conventional rights, then, was
the level of electoral risk the legislators thought they were incurring; 9
(vi) The danger to the conventions, that is, the political under-
standings which were thought to be basic to the societal consensus,
was that legislatures might use their residual power to curtail them.
Hence, the argument goes, the entrenchment of these political
understandings and freedoms in the constitution was necessitated
because they were of such profound importance to the Canadian
polity that their fate could not be left to the caprices of elected
9 In the very case which paved the way for the judiciary to become a central
political institution, the Supreme Court of Canada held that while such
conventions were not an essential component of the foundation of our legal
polity, they were very nearly so; they had a quasi-constitutional character;
Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [19811 1 S.C.R. 753. While no one
in the legal world quite understood what, in legal terms, this meant, leading
to the usual pedantic debates, the politicians were not left in any doubt as
to what the Supreme Court was suggesting: they would ignore the conventions
at their peril. Unquestionably, this holding had a major impact on the ensuing
political wheeling and dealing. For a more extensive analysis, see H.J. Glasbeek
& M. Mandel, "The Legalization of Politics in Advanced Capitalism: The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1984), 2 Socialist Studies 84;
see also the discussion in the text at nn. 75-79.
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representatives. A government ought not to feel free, just because
it had a momentary majority, to limit the scope of entitlements
which ought to be recognized as fundamental rights and freedoms.
Thus it is that, since the entrenchment of the Charter in the
constitution, such attempted limitations are to be subjected to review
by an independent institution - the judiciary. While the entrenching
document does provide that a legislature can still limit the entrenched
rights and freedoms, it must now provide justifications which satisfy
courts,' 0 rather than a majority of the electorate whose approval
it will have to seek at some future, unspecified, date. That is, the
courts are, by definition, no longer bound to accept an otherwise
properly enacted law as a legitimate exercise in democracy. They
are to look beyond the immediate desires and goals of legislatures
or beyond those of the majority of the public. Because the entrenched
rights and freedoms are now, formally, the paramount tenets of
our polity, the courts are charged, much as trustees are on behalf
of some identifiable beneficiary, to be the final guardians of society's
welfare. By defining the scope and extent of the entrenched rights,
courts also will be defining the welfare to which the Canadian
people ought to aspire and to which they are entitled.
The logic of this reasoning also ought to mean that, as judicial
rulings in respect of disputes brought to the courts also lead to
the setting of social norms, courts also ought to be subjected to
the restrictions found in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. But,
the judges of whether or not the common law courts have exceeded
the permissible boundaries by their rulings would be other judges.
This creates something of a difficulty,which so far has been solved
by holding that the courts are in a special position.'" The important
point for our present purposes is that it is unquestioned that judicial
review of legislative conduct is the linch-pin of the new Canadian
constitutional arrangement. Its proponents argue that it has been
chosen for this task because it is the best means available by which
to promote Canadians' right to sovereign, dignified lives, free of
10 Section 1 reads: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees
the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society."
I The Supreme Court of Canada has sought to avoid the problem by holding
that judges are not state officials. In so doing, a bizarre form of argument
was used by McIntyre, J., in Retai4 Wholesale and Department Store Union
(R WD.S.U.), Loc. 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 600:
"While in political science terms it is probably acceptable to treat the courts
as one of the three fundamental branches of Government, that is, legislative,
executive, and judicial, I cannot equate for the purposes of Charter application
the order of a court with an element of governmental action." The Supreme
Court of Canada, no doubt recognizing the speciousness of its argument,
did throw Charter proponents a bone. It suggested that when judges apply
the common law in disputes between private citizens, they should do so
with the spirit of the Charter in their minds. What this will come to mean
is anyone's guess. The more extreme proponents of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms see this as an abdication of judicial responsibility. Beatty,
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unwonted fetters. The argument is that this is being done to perfect
our democratic system of government;
(vii) The 1982 Constitution Act did not purport to change Canada's
institutional framework. To the contrary. We are still to honour
the monarchy. Canada is still to be a federal nation with each of
the provincial and the federal legislatures capable of exercising the
plenary powers with which they are invested, by the British North
America Act and by subsequent amendments. The notion that elected
governments are the supreme governors of the country, that is, the
notion of parliamentary democracy, is still held out to be the
cornerstone of the political system.' 2 Yet, subjecting governmental
decision-making - because it might affect certain rights and
freedoms - to judicial review does change the system, precisely
because the rights and freedoms which are to be subjected to judicial
control are identified as the supporting pillars of the Canadian
political edifice. Inasmuch as Canada wanted to retain its claim
to be a parliamentary democracy (one in which the electorate
governs through its chosen representatives and the agencies they
oversee), some limit on judicial review of legislation had to be
imposed to make the Charter saleable;
(viii) For this reason, section 33 was inserted into the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. The intended effect of this 'notwithstanding'
clause is that a legislature can always ensure that it retains the
sovereignty it had enjoyed prior to the advent of the Charter by
providing specifically that judicial review is not to be binding on
it, even if, in a court's opinion, the legislators have improperly
"Constitutional Conceits: The Coercive Authority of the Courts" (1987),
37 UT.LJ. 183, has argued that the Charter's dictates must apply to all
decision-makers. A puzzle as to how this is to be enforced against judges
is left lying around; for another elaborate attempt to make this argument,
but, one which ultimately fails to convince because of its lack of connection
to real life, see Slattery, "The Charter's Relevance to Private Litigation:
Does Dolphin Deliver?" (1987), 32 McGill LJ. 905.
12 The latest attempt at amendment of the Constitution is the Meech Lake
Accord. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine this Accord,
one thing is crystal clear: it was included with the minimum of citizen
participation, echoing the assertion made in the text at n. 5. This has given
rise to occasional comments. Jim Coutts wrote that "throughout the
19 1/2 hour secret meeting, there were problems in coming to grips with
basic concepts.... Let's not attack the dedication of the participants, but
let's make it clear they cannot dissolve Canada without a fight. And let's
not be fooled by an all-night session that pretends to adopt fundamental
concepts of what a country is."; Sid Handleman showed his concern with
the process when he wrote: "Eleven first ministers have rushed headlong
into an agreement that even they admit is fuzzy and incapable of exact
interpretation. They have not asked for our consent. Ontario's David Peterson
arrogantly promises us a full debate in the fall - presumably following
an election." Toronto Star, 7 June 1987, B3. This does raise the issue of
how serious our commitment to democracy is, and, by extension, how yet
another elite means of political decision-making - the judiciary armed
with the Charter - could possibly lead to more democracy. For a reassurance
1989
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infringed guaranteed rights and freedoms. The political risk of such
infringement by legislation enacted under the aegis of section 33
is to be borne directly by parliamentarians;
Here I interrupt the flow of the rude summary of arguments made
by Charter proponents to make an editorial point.
In theory, it could be said that, as a consequence of the insertion
of section 33, the nature of our parliamentary democracy has not
been altered. But this, of course, would ignore the fact that, in the
new context - the Charter context - it will require much more
political courage for legislators to use section 33 than it did for
them to pass legislation "in potential conflict with one of the
constraining, but non-binding, conventions in pre- Charter days. That
is, it has been understood from the beginning that section 33 is
only likely to be used in exceptional circumstances.' 3 This means
that the imposition of judicial control over elected assemblies and
their agencies has made, and had been intended to make, 14 a
of the public by a political booster of the Charter to the effect that,
fundamentally, Canada has been left unchanged by the Charter, see Thomas
Wells, "Canada's New Constitution", Throne Speech debate, April 15, 1982,
reprinted by Government of Ontario.
13 It is, after all, the essence of the Charter proponents' argument that it was
all too easy for governments to override what these proponents deem to
be fundamental rights and freedoms. It would hardly make sense to claim
to have protected such rights and freedoms if s. 33 was thought to leave
the legislatures with as much freedom to curb fundamental rights and
freedoms as they ever had. This was freely admitted by Charter proponents;
see Strayer, "Life Under the Canadian Charter: Adjusting the Balance
between Legislatures and Courts", [1988] Public Law 347, 353: "It was
certainly the assumption of those governments which agreed to [s.33] in
1981 that it would be used rarely, and then only where a particular judicial
decision had created problems of governance of such a nature that a
government would be able to justify at least a temporary override of normal
Charter guarantees." Strayer was Assistant-Deputy Minister of Justice during
the constitution-making process, and played a prominent part in it. See also,
Wilson J., who attributes the rare use of s.33 to the fact that it amounts
to political suicide by a government; see her "The Making of a Constitution:
Approaches to Judicial Interpretation", [1988] Public Law 370, 375; see
also P. Russell, "The Effect of a Charter of Rights on the Policy-Making
Role of Canadian Courts" (1982), 25 Car Pub. Admin. 1. Early on, Quebec
felt betrayed by the constitutional processes. It passed legislation saying
that it was "notwithstanding" all of its legislation. This use of s.33, the
democracy-guaranteeing provision of the Charter, by an elected government
which, we have every reason to believe, was reflecting its people's bitterness
with the negotiation processes, was held to be unconstitutional by a federally
appointed Quebec Court of Appeal which argued that the use of s.33 had
to be serious, one which showed a true concern with the a priori inviolability
of the Charter rights; Alliance des Professeurs de Montreal v. Le Procureur
General du Quebec et Le Procureur General du Canada, [1985] C.S. 1272.
This approach was rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ford v.
Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, Devine v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 790, but
it does indicate that governments are not meant to use s.33 lightly.
14 The Quebec government, once again, has used the notwithstanding provision
to defend an immensely popular law which had been thrown out by the
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difference to what had been deemed to be the cornerstone of
Canada's political system: democracy via a system of parliamentary
sovereignty. The introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
into the Constitution, then, did require justification. A selling job
had to be done, and done in a specific manner: the Charter had
to be shown to further the goals and objectives of a parliamentary
democracy as they had been understood in pre-Charter days. I now
return to the arguments of Charter proponents.
(ix) One of the things which, it is claimed, shows that the
entrustment of the nature and scope of fundamental rights and
freedoms to the judiciary reflects our democratic experiences is
that an overwhelming number of the electorate were, and remain,
in favour of the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Public opinion polls taken during the entrenchment processes
showed that, in 1980, 91 percent, and later, as the public debate
heated up in 1981, 84 percent of the population, supported the
concept of constitutionally guaranteed rights.' 5 In this context, it
is not surprising that there were very few politicians who spoke
against the Charter. The inference that proponents of the Charter
would like to be drawn 16 is that, if a majority of both the people
and the political 61ite actually favoured its introduction, the charge
that the enshrinement of the Charter was not democratic in nature
cannot be true;
(x) In any event, these proponents argue, even if the Charter's
promotion of judicial review of government activity does connote
a change in constitutional arrangements, it is a change compatible
with our existing practices.
In a pluralistic society such as Canada there are many kinds
of disputes and many mechanisms for dispute resolution. The
Supreme Court of Canada in Ford v. Quebec (A.G.), supra note 13. The
outcry was immediate. Politicians of all stripes (The Prime Minister, Mr.
Mulroney, the Premier of Ontario, Mr. Peterson) expressed their regret at
the undermining of the Charter and there were calls for the repeal of s.33.
Note that when the Saskatchewan government used s.33 to support its anti-
worker law there was nothing like such a backlash from the forces of the
establishment, although there was some. This difference in attitude dovetails
with the arguments to be made in the latter part of this paper.
'5 Polls as cited by Weiler, "Rights and Judges in a Democracy: A New Canadian
Version" (1984/85), 18 U Mich J. of Law Reform 51, 52.
16 No serious commentator is bold enough to argue explicitly that just because
a majority of the public and the politicians like the Charter this means
that its entrenchment constituted a legitimate way to transfer institutional
power in Canadian society. After all - as we know - the essence of
the argument of Charter proponents is that the Charter is there to protect
individuals against majoritarian views. To rely on majority support as a
way to legitimate the document itself, therefore, is something of a logical
contradiction. Yet, while the 'opinion poll' argument is not made in intellectual
milieux, it is important to note that public opinion polls were taken and
were frequently cited during the entrenchment process; see Thomas Wells,
supra note 12.
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Canadian judiciary always has had a prominent, indeed a pre-
eminent, role as a dispute-settling institution. For instance, one of
the inherent difficulties for any federal system, and particularly so
for Canada with its two founding nations, is the on-going disputation
over power between the federal and the provincial governments
and between the provincial governments inter se. These tensions
raise some of the most vital issues of democracy we have to confront,
inasmuch as they go to the scope of the relative autonomy of
localized groups within the larger whole. In Canada,judicial review
of the federal constitutional arrangements has been the legitimate,
and legitimated, way of resolving these kinds of problems when
exercises in political power and bargaining have failed to do so.
The courts have been deemed to be, and have been respected as,
appropriate allocators and guardians of democratic rights sought
to be preserved through the federal system. The limited transference
of power to the judiciary entailed in the entrenchment of the Charter
can thus be said to be compatible with accepted practices in Canada,
practices which are acceptable because the courts are well-equipped
to deal with these kinds of disputes;
(xi) Courts bring two things to decision-making which the electoral
or any other participatory political processes do not: neutrality and
reasoned decision-making. A decision is the result of a debate
between rival claimants who are able to put their best arguments
forward because there are known criteria on which judges rely to
make their decisions. This rational, adversary system puts constraints
on the judges because they have to abide by existing criteria and
show that they have done so. While everyone recognizes that there
is some measure of discretion when courts interpret and apply these
criteria, the necessity to give reasons within a bounded context will
restrain judges from acting capriciously, that is, restrain them from
basing their decisions merely on their own political values and
beliefs. This, plus the fact that the disputing parties decide for
themselves which arguments and what evidence they want to bring
forth in support of their claim, makes the judicial decision-making
acceptable to the disputing parties (although the losers are often
unhappy about the actual result) and to the public at large.' 7 This
makes it appropriate for courts to determine how disputations about
basic rights ought to be settled. Moreover, this description of the
adjudicative system points to another positive aspect of the enshrin-
ement of the Charter,
(xii) The Charter of Rights and Freedoms has given individual
citizens the power to claim, directly, that they are to be the
beneficiaries of values which are fundamental to our political system.
A means has been provided to raise the level of participation and
quality of political discourse in a way that mass political processes
do not permit. This is an advance for the political community which
17 See, Weiler, "Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making" (1968), 46 Can.
B. Rev 406; also his "Legal Values and Judicial Decision-Making" (1970),
48 Can. B. Rev. 1, and the literature cited in those articles.
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is Canada. The courts are an appropriate forum in which to give
content and specificity to the rights which are fundamental to
Canadian society because the judges have no electoral, nor material,
stake in making choices one way or another between claimants
and rights. From their "above-the-fray" position they can adjudicate
on the scope the rights in question ought to have, using as a basis
for decision-making the known shared political values and aims
of society. While, from time to time, it may be difficult for judges
to determine whether one interpretation of the scope and effect
of an entrenched right is more acceptable than another, it is clear
that, given that the named rights and freedoms have been entrenched
because their furtherance is crucial to the achievement of the goals
of a liberal democracy, each individual has been granted as much
right to self-determination as it is convenient to give in a societal
context. Far from detracting from democratic practices, then, the
specification of the scope and the enforcement of the Charter's rights
and freedoms by the judiciary will lend support to them, indeed
enhance them, by (i), creating a greater consciousness of what rights
can properly be claimed in a true democracy and by (ii), fortifying
the claims of people whose democratic right to have their views
and interests protected might be lost in the cruder world of electoral
mass politics, the device we relied on pre-Charter to achieve the
same aims.
These, then, are the main lines of arguments which Charter
advocates offer in support of the entrenchment of rights and freedoms
which has given judicial review a new political significance in
Canada. Not all proponents use all of the arguments listed. Indeed,
many would not want to be cast in the position of having to defend
some of the arguments. For instance, as already noted, and as will
be shown again below, it requires little sophistication to see through
the argument that judges are limited by logically created boundaries
arising from well-established criteria for decision-making. But, this
does not mean that people who would not make this argument
themselves are not happy to profit from the fact that it is made.
The listed arguments are advocates' arguments. This is what it is
important to understand: the people who make these arguments
are advocates. All of the arguments listed are made by people who
are trying to show that the entrenchment of rights and freedoms
is justified in a nation-state which perceives and represents itself
as a liberal democracy. Those who do not agree with all of the
arguments of their fellow advocates/sellers of this idea are none-
theless content to receive the parasitic benefit conferred upon them
by the mere fact that these other arguments are made.' 8 Advocates
18 This is a common enough phenomenon in legal political discourse. Take,
for instance, the seemingly endless fault-no fault debates in respect of personal
injury compensation. Insurance companies are very happy to let lawyers
make all the public running with their claims of superiority for the adversary
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are not very particular as to how the case they want to win is
won. This, in large part, explains why it is that some of the arguments
listed are made at all. None are convincing; most are barely plausible.
Let us consider them.
(a) The argument that Canadian dissidents and minorities needed
this kind of protection
There was no apprehension that the fundamental rights and
freedoms now found in section 2 of the Charter were in peril at
the time the entrenchment process was in train. While the Charter
proponents argued that no government should be in a position to
remove the right to freedom of speech, the right to political and
religious beliefs, the right to associate, etc., no one said that Canadian
governments presented, or were likely to present, a clear and present
danger to these rights. There were some mutterings about the
invocation of the War Measures Act in Quebec during the FLQ
crisis, but, in the event, the entrenchment of the Charter did not
include provisions which repealed the existing War Measures Act.' 9
Note that the Charter does specifically provide that the universal
franchise and the right to vote for a new government in given periods
is not to be attacked by a government, but leaves it open for
parliament to refuse to dissolve itself in times of crisis. 20 That is,
the pre-Charter position was not changed in any substantial way
because it was not plausible to argue that democratic, electoral
rights were in imminent danger. Rather, the Charter sellers had
to reach back to some of Canada's more shameful moments, such
system over other forms of bureaucratic settlement, with their arguments
that individual responsibility can be promoted through the fault system, and
with the arguments that damages are tailored to the actual harm suffered
and that damages awarded in some way measure the degree of fault. Yet,
insurers know full-well that there can be no viable fault-based system unless
there is private insurance (that is, unless there is an accepted diminution
of individual responsibility); they are also aware that damages are at best
a guess and that the amounts settled upon are frequently a function of a
combination of the cost to the insurers of keeping files open and the bargaining
position of the victims; further, they are conscious of the fact that the degree
of fault will only be related to the amount of damages awarded by the
most peculiar of coincidences (e.g. gross fault may only lead to minor injury
and, therefore, a small amount of damages; a trivial amount of fault may
lead to great injury and huge damages). Insurers say little about any of
this because as long as lawyers make their kind of fault-supporting arguments,
the arguments for the retention of private insurance will make instinctive
sense to the policy-makers. Insurers will not have to rely openly on the
much less politically appealing arguments which they would have to make
otherwise, such as, that "private" is better than "public", that profits must
be favoured at the expense of bleeding victims and their dependents, etc.
19 The War Measures Act is now repealed but it has been replaced by something
which potentially seems to give very wide sweeping governmental powers
which might, should the new provisions be invoked, seriously abrogate the
entrenched rights and freedoms in the Charter, see Val Sears, "Coping with
Crises; Will New Law Work?", Toronto Star, 27 March 1988, BI.
20 S. 4(1), (2), Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
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as the war-time mistreatment of Japanese-Canadians. While this
did strike a satisfying righteous note, it did not constitute a very
convincing argument. After all, the United States had treated their
people of Japanese descent and origin in much the same way as
did Canada, and yet the United States already had a fully-fledged
Bill of Rights at that time.2' Moreover, while the Charter advocates
never tired of using the Japanese-Canadian example, none of them
were forthcoming as to what kind of redress (if any) should be
offered to the victims and their successors. 22 The fact that the
Japanese-Canadians example was nothing but a hook on which
to hang the Charter, and a not very firm one at that, thus was
made transparently clear to all who wished to look. In addition,
while Charter sellers were beating their breasts over our repre-
hensible past they never suggested that they no longer shared the
up-to-then commonly professed belief that Canada was already
one of the freest countries on the globe. This was notjust an averment
by smug politicians at banquets; it was part of the conventionally
received wisdom, so much so that it was not questioned by serious
legal scholars. Thus, Hogg wrote that "[iut is a fact, however, that
in Canada - as in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand
- civil liberties are better respected than in most other countries." 23
To underscore further the shallowness of their stance, note that,
while arguing for Charter protection of individuals and dis-
empowered groups, none of the Charter sellers was suggesting that
it was quite possible that entities which never had had any right
to avail themselves of political freedoms, precisely because they
were just that - entities - would now be able to do so. Yet,
this was not unforeseeable nor, indeed, unforeseen, by Charter
proponents. For instance Mr. McMurtry, the then Attorney-General
of Ontario, a man who was to take much of the kudos for the
constitutional deal eventually struck at the infamous kitchen meeting
21 Korematsu v. U.S. (1944) U.S. 214. Sometimes the Charter sellers used
Canada's ugly treatment of the Dukhobors or the Jehovah Witnesses as
examples. To my knowledge, there was no similar reliance on the oppression
and deportation of working class activists and communists by Canadian
governments. For a good account of this rarely mentioned anti-civil liber-
tarianism, see J. Fudge, "Voluntarism and Compulsion: The Canadian Federal
Government's Intervention in Collective Bargaining from 1900 to 1946",
D. Phil thesis, Uni. of Oxford, 1988; R. Whitaker, "Official Repression of
Communism During World War II" (1986), 17 Labour/Le Travail 135.
22 But the rhetoric used by the sellers of the Charter may well have helped
the Japanese-Canadians' cause to get recognition and compensation. In 1988,
some 7 years after the public debates in which the national shame was
invoked, the Japanese-Canadians were able to obtain a settlement they felt
they could accept from the federal government.
23 Constitutional Law of Canada (1977), 418. Or see McIntyre J.'s comment
on the T.V. programme "W5", on 14 December, 1988: "If you had gone
to the ordinary layman in the street ten years before the Charter was even
spoken about, listed the rights that we were going to have and ask him
if he was in favour of it, he would have been horrified to think that he
didn't already have those rights."
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in November of 1981, waited for that deal to have been made
before he made this clear. At a meeting of the dlite of the corporate
bar of Toronto and its clientele he told his audience not to be
anxious about the Charter because the newly declared freedoms
would not give consumers and workers an edge in the battle against
the corporate world. Rather, Mr. McMurtry pointed out, while the
Charter bestowed rights on individuals "our courts would not engage
in such a narrow and mean-spirited interpretation as to deny the
protection of the Charter to corporate entities." At the same meeting
a panel of lawyers, dissecting the provisions of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, argued that "with some liberal interpretations ...
the rights' code might give corporations greater legal protection
from a number of restrictive laws." 24 Nothing could be clearer.
The advocates of the Charter told their story in much the same
way that a car manufacturer tells its story: "Here is a car; it can
go at certain speeds; it compares favourably with other like
automobiles; it has special design features; we suggest it may give
you status (sometimes with the opposite sex, sometimes just status)
and we, who bring you this car, will look after you and it and
respect you forever." Seldom do automobile manufacturers explain
that the car could have been made safer if different metal had
been used, if it had been built differently, if it had less protuberances
inside, or if it had a gas tank which was not placed as close to
the rear of the car as it was. Rarely do they acknowledge that
their car really is not different to other competing cars in respect
of important features such as engine design and capacity, or that
it has no real spare tire, or that, in the past, their manufacturers'
warranties often have fallen far short of the promises held out,
etc. The Charter proponents did not, like car manufacturers do not,
tell everything they knew or could have been expected to know.
24 As reported in the Globe and Mail, 6 February 1982, A 12. The same article
pointed out that when the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was being debated
before a parliamentary committee more than a year before this meeting
of corporate lawyers, Mr. Chrdtien and his Justice officials had stressed
the point that the wording of the proposed Charter was designed to benefit
only individuals. As far as it is known, Mr. McMurtry did not raise his
view to the contrary at that time. Opponents of the Charter had seen the
potential for corporations but their voice was not heard so clearly; see R.A.
Hasson "How to Hand Weapons to Your Enemies - The Charter of Rights
Fiasco" (June 1982), No.5 Steelshots. Professor Hasson warned that the
Charter would be an instrument readily available to corporations who would
unquestionably use it more successfully than any other group. He has been
proven to be all too right. The fact that opponents found it hard to be
heard points to one of the more serious flaws in the Charter proponents'
arguments. While Professor Hasson's voice was not stilled by repressive
governmental action, it found it hard to reach an audience because the
means of speech are controlled by a few private groups who can constrain
freedom of speech without risk; see Glasbeek, "Entrenchment of Freedom
of Speech for the Press - Fettering of Freedom of Speech of the People"
in Anisman & Linden (eds.) The Media, the Courts and the Charter (1986)
101.
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None of this means, of course, that the argument that it was
wise to entrench political rights and freedoms in order to protect
them from capricious, would-be totalitarian, legislators is devoid
of merit. It does mean that no one was willing to confront this
issue directly because this would have necessitated proffering
evidence about the likelihood of the emergence of totalitarianism.
In turn, this would have raised the issue as to how it could be
argued that an elected majority, ready to thwart the existing social
consensus in a radical way, would be prevented from doing so by
judicial review. That is, if we had been asked to imagine a headstrong
government willing to ignore the citizenry, how could we have been
asked to imagine that this same anti-democratic, oppressive regime
would pay respect to the judiciary? After all, are there not many
modem examples of countries in which the government uses its
power regardless of so-called legal constraints? The point here is
that while the selling of the Charter relied on raising the spectre
of totalitarianism, the public could not be permitted to feel that
Canadian totalitarianism could ever reach a stage where thejudiciary
might be subjugated. And this was how the selling campaign was
run: it used past events to show the capacity for nasty legislative
and executive conduct, permitting the suggestion that over-zealous
or evil legislators and officers might seek to act in similar ways
again, but that the palpable difference would be that, this time,
armed with a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the judiciary would
be there to protect the hapless victims. Note here that it is much
easier to make this argument in respect of an incident such as
the oppression of the Japanese-Canadians than it is about a FLQ-
type crisis. This is so because the former relates to the curtailment
of precious rights and freedoms of a small identifiable part of the
population, whereas, in the second situation, everyone's rights and
freedoms would be abrogated. It is more politically astute and easier
to ask the public to imagine a government which might stray a
little and, therefore, can be contained by willing, good men (judges
are mostly men) than it is to suggest that well-meaning people,
with moral suasion as their only means of enforcement, could
constrain a government which acts in a truly martial, totalitarian
way.
In sum, the necessity for entrenchment because of the fear of
majoritarian attacks on essential democratic rights was never argued
out fully. At best, this part of the Charter proponents' argument
was one of half-truths whose subliminal messages were to act on
the public's unburdened imagination.
(b) The argument that to charge a judiciary with these new
obligations is not anti-democratic because a majority of the
people support this idea
While this argument has not been relied upon heavily by 6lite
proponents of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, nonetheless it
was permitted to further the perception that entrenchment was (and
is) a "good" thing. The fact that the polls showed strong public
support for the enshrinement of the Charter was, after all, some
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indication of popular approval. Yet, it is hard to imagine that the
polls could have shown anything other than this. The Charter was
offered to the public as giving something precious - rights and
freedoms - to the population. It would have been very surprising
if, when asked a question such as : "Do you want fundamental
rights?", the population would have said "Hell, no". That the
superficial and beguiling way 25 the question was put to a population,
which played no direct part in the constitution-making process,
led to a misleading set of poll results, can be gleaned from the
fact that a study done after the Charter had been enshrined shows
that the vast majority of Canadians still have no idea what the
Charter's contents are, how it is working or how it could possibly
work. The study done by a group led by Professor Russell shows
that 90% of English Canadians and 70% of French Canadians say
they have heard of the Charter. A substantial majority of each group
think the Charter "is a good thing for Canada". But most appeared
to have little knowledge as to what is in the Charter.26 The argument
offered here is not that people would not have wanted the Charter
if they had understood more of its ramifications and implications.
We will never know. But, let us speculate, as Professor Petter did.
He asked what would have happened if people had been addressed
in the following way:27
Suppose tomorrow it were announced that a Political Entitlements
Tribunal would be established; that the Tribunal would be given
sweeping powers to curtail the activities of modem government in
the name of protecting such vaguely expressed entitlements as
"liberty", "equality" and "fundamental justice"; that the Tribunal
would be staffed by nine, white, affluent lawyers, seven of whom
would be men, all of whom would be beyond middle age; that
members of the Tribunal would retain office until the age of seventy-
five and would be politically accountable to no one; and that the
cost of bringing a claim before the Tribunal would likely exceed
one quarter of a million dollars.
Petter asked, rhetorically: "What would one's reaction to such a
proposal be?". Or, alternatively, let us say that, when asking people
about their support for the Charter, the respondents had been told
that Prime Minister Trudeau only wanted to enshrine the Charter
to subjugate Quebec's aspirations. There might have well been
startlingly different results in Quebec as opposed to those obtained
in English Canada. These speculations make it clear that the Charter
25 As summed up by the Globe & Mail, Oct. 22, 29, Nov. 10, 1981, the
demonstrated support for the Charter was the result of a survey in which,
"Canadians were asked whether they supported a bill of rights which would
'provide individual Canadians with protection against unfair treatment by
any level of government in Canada"'.
26 Peter H. Russell, "Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Political
Report", [1988] Public Law 385, 398.
27 Petter, "Backwards March: The Political Wrongs of Charter Rights". Paper
presented at Conference on Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Uni.
of Edinburgh, May 20-21, 1988.
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was not an idea which was democratically debated by the citizenry
of this country. The majoritarian support claimed for it is not based
on any reliable evidence.
(c) The argument that judges have the ability to deal with difficult
questions and that they will be informed by the Charter's clearly
spelled-out goals
It is a commonplace that the language of the Charter is malleable.
As Wilson J. has written:
[T]he protected rights are enumerated in a brief written document
and they are couched in broad and contestable terms such as "liberty",
"security" and "equality". These are concepts upon which libraries
have been written, kings have been beheaded and revolutions have
been waged. It would therefore be a considerable understatement
to say that fundamental human rights are "open-textured". 28
More vivid imagery was used by Peter Russell when talking about
phrases such as freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, the
right to liberty, the right to equal benefit of the law without
discrimination:
I think of these phrases as limp balloons which the constitution-
makers have handed to the judiciary; the judges must now decide
how much air to blow into them. 29
The argument that this presents no problem is not very convincing.
The claim that common law methodology has always askedjudges
to cope with plastic and vague precepts and phraseology and that
they have done this very well does not merit serious analysis. The
realists in the 1930's made, and the critical legal scholars to-day
make, a meal out of the incoherence of judicial methodology.
Inasmuch as the argument is that we have always entrusted our
judges with constitutional issues arising out of federalism's problems
and that they have done this well as, say, opposed to dealing with
such issues as what is 'reasonably foreseeable' in torts' cases, it
can also be dismissed. In the first place, even if true, it is not a
useful argument. As Wilson J. has pointed out 30 , when dealing with
s. 91-92 matters, courts are not asked to say that legislatures are
behaving in a manner which is acceptable to the fundamental values
of Canadian society. Rather, they are to decide whether one
legislature, as opposed to some other, is the appropriate institution
to deal with a legislative matter. They are not required to say that
no legislature can pass a particular law. While courts have frequently
thwarted the democratic aspirations of distinct groupings of Can-
adians when adjudicating on s.91-92 matters, the courts' role,
therefore, has not been overtly anti-democratic. The judiciary's
legitimacy is not called into question when exercising this kind
of constitutional discretion on the basis that it should not be involved
28 Supra note 13, 372.
29 Supra note 26, 394.
30 Supra note 13, 370-71.
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in such exercises at all. Even so, courts have been severely criticized
because of the way they have exercised their discretion in that area.
Thus, it is not even true that they do this task well. For instance,
Monahan has shown that the major characteristic of the Supreme
Court of Canada's involvement in constitutional adjudication in
pre- Charter days was incoherence arising out of vague, inarticulate
and differing visions of federalism. 3'
This brings us back to the centre of the problem. If we leave
decision-making about rights and freedoms, which are said to be
fundamental to our political system, to the courts, we must be assured
that there are mechanisms which discipline judicial reasoning. In
their absence, the argument that an unaccountable 61ite has been
left in charge of determining our basic political rights would be
a compelling one.
This problem is not a new one. The judiciary has always been
aware of the need to be perceived as rendering impartial decisions:
If the law is evidently partial and unjust, it will mask nothing,
legitimise nothing, contribute nothing to any class's hegemony.
32
Sometimes judges have admitted that they have a great deal of
leeway when making decisions. Talking about the Charter's prede-
cessor, the Canadian Bill of Rights, Laskin C.J. wrote:
There may be differences about the scope of the discretion, but there
cannot be any dispute about its existence. As I said at the beginning
of my remarks, each judge puts his own questions and supplies his
own answers and, in yielding ground to institutional considerations,
he does so according to his own assessment of what they demand.33
The danger such admissions present to the judiciary as an institution,
especially with the advent of the Charter, is plain. Thus it is that
judges have been at pains to say that they are aware of the centrality
of their new roles, but that Canadians need not fear that judges
will abuse their power. Sometimes they tell us that they do not
have as much flexibility as some people might think; on other
occasions, and more credibly, they tell us that they will constrain
themselves prudentially. Their personal whims and inclinations will
give way to the signals which emanate from the well-established
political consensus of Canadian society.34 As a result there is general
agreement that the courts should approach the Charter from a
31 Monahan, "At Doctrine's Twilight: The Structure of Canadian Federalism"
(1984), 34 UT.LJ. 47.
32 E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (1975) 26.
33 Laskin, "The Role and Functions of Final Appellate Courts" (1975), 53
Can. Bar Rev. 469, 481.
34 That the judges are conscious of their new importance is revealed by many
of their statements. While they profess to be awed by their new responsibility,
there is also a good deal of indication that they are enjoying their new
centrality. For instance, in a celebration of the Charter of Rights on the
CTV programme "W5", aired on December 14, 1986, Dickson C.J. said
that he was "willing to challenge anything that stands in the way of the
Charter's realization" and that "the coming years will undoubtedly see the
Supreme Court play a major role in shaping the legal, moral and social
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purposive point of view. This interpretive approach has gained the
imprimatur of most leading commentators, 35 as well as of the
contours of our country. I am confident our court is strong, healthy, ready
to meet the challenges and responsibilities awaiting it." During the same
programme, when asked whether the public was over-rating the significance
of the Charter, Dickson replied: "I don't think it's possible to answer that
at this time. I think it's too early. We have great expectations .. " On the
other hand, Lamer J. seemed to want to indicate that it would be wrong
for people to think that the justices love the new power they have been
given. "I can assure you I don't find anything pleasant about it.... It's
part of being a judge. It is like asking a surgeon if he is comfortable cutting
somebody's leg off. He says 'Well, I just do it. I get used to it."' Winnipeg
Free Press, 14 April 1987, 16. But, in the Globe & Mail, April 11, 1987,
Al, D 1, the same justice was quoted as having said: "I compare these times
with the day after Pasteur's discovery. It's that fundamental. Even if we
keep repeating that the Charter has not changed that much, it has changed
a whole equation. I wish to God I were a law student being called to the
Bar next year." The Supreme Court of Canada justices' awareness that they
may have some discretion and that this may be perceived as being a bad
thing is also clear from their statements. Some of them argue that they
can suppress their personal feelings, others admit that they come into play.
In public, at least, nearly all of them suggest that there is no serious problem.
Mr. Justice Sopinka, some time after his appointment, rejected the idea that
judicial appointments in Canada should be made after a confirmation process
mirroring that of the United States. His point was that it would be
embarrassing and silly to subject nominees to the questions about such high
profile issues as abortion, capital punishment and homosexuality. The Toronto
Star, Sept. 14, 1988, A.5, quoted him as saying: "It seems counter-productive
to wrest these ideas of bias from a prospective judge when he or she is
expected to decide free of them". He apparently believes that judges can
rise above their predilections. On the day his appointment was announced,
in response to the question above whether it was his Progressive Conservative
party connections which had led to his appointment Sopinka said that he
could not be politically typed because he had associated with all kinds of
political groupings. He noted that he had also represented members of the
Liberal Party. This notion of the width of the Canadian political spectrum
tells us something about the judiciary's understanding of Canada's political
profile. Sometimes the justices admit that their values creep into decision-
making, but they are relatively confident they can do so without Canadians
having to worry. Chouinard J., in the "W5" programme cited above, said:
"There is no doubt about that. It will be difficult sometimes, perhaps, when
the time comes to pass, for lack of a better word, what I will call a moral
judgment on the reasonableness of a piece of legislation ... that will be
a sort of a moral judgment that we will have to pass.... One has feelings
about these things." Lamer J., in the same programme, said: "I am called
on to make value judgments, and I am not going to make value judgments
with somebody else's values, I am going to make those judgments with
my values. I think they are good." La Forest J. in the same programme,
did note the difficulties this might present: "This will inevitably create an
ongoing debate among people. You know they respect us up to a point
and I hope that we continue to be respected in terms of our honesty and
conscientiousness in arriving at these decisions. But obviously there are people
who will not necessarily agree with us. We can be out of tune with society."
35 Eg., P.W. Hogg, "The Charter of Rights and American Theories of Inter-
pretation" (1987), 25 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 87; R. Sharpe, "The Charter
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judiciary. Thus, in the very first case to reach the Supreme Court
of Canada, Estey J. stated that "narrow and technical interpretation"
which could "stunt the growth of the law and hence the community
it serves" would not be acceptable to the judiciary when dealing
with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.36 In the Big M case, Dickson
C.J. set out that this rejection of a narrow approach meant that
a purposive approach was to be used.37 He was building on his
own decision in Hunter v. Southam Inc.38 All of these passages
have been frequently, indeed slavishly, cited in subsequent decisions.
The purposive interpretative approach appears to be defined by
juxtaposing it to other possible approaches. It is contrasted with
formalism, the reading of the words of a text as if they had intrinsic
meaning. It also rejects the idea that the private views of a judge
should permit her to make her decision first and then tailor her
reasoning to justify it later. That is, what is expected is that the
judge, as a member of her community, will look for the essentially
agreed-upon political morality which gives the text which she has
to interpret an acceptable meaning. While it is understood that,
as a matter of legal logic, this may not yield only one possible
result in any one case, it is assumed that the range of results will
be perceived as legitimate by the public, thereby legitimating the
decision-makers who bring them to the population.
The questions raised are: (i) are the courts, in fact, capable of
using methodologies which can be said to amount to a purposive
approach in this way? and (ii) is the discretion embedded in such
an approach so large that courts are, in fact, left with a wide range
of choices when making decisions, enabling them to give their
personal biases sway?
In a very fine article, Peck has shown, in considerable detail,
how open-ended the language of the Charter really is. His analysis
of the cases shows that the Supreme Court of Canada has been
able to choose liberally amongst the rich menu of both alternative
modes of interpretation and sources of interpretation available to
them. For instance, as part of Peck's discussion of the celebrated
decision in Oakes39, he points out that the courts decided to put
the onus of showing the reasonableness of the interfering legislation
in issue on the government. While this fits in with the notion that
the Charter is there to protect the citizenry from the government,
Peck notes that neither legal nor political logic mandated that the
burden of proof should be allocated in this way. Further, in
determining whether the legislative instrument in question is pro-
portionate as required by the tests devised in Oakes, the courts will
have to determine the object of the legislation in question. This
is known to be a bedevilling task, one which the courts have not
of Rights and Freedoms and the Supreme Court of Canada: The First Four
Years", [1987] Public Law 48.
36 Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker (1984), 9 D.LR (4th) 161, 168.
37 R v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., (1985), 18 D.LR (4th) 321, 359-60.
38 (1984), 11 D.LR (4th) 641.
39 R v. Oakes (1986), 26 D.LR (4th) 200.
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discharged with distinction over time. As part of the Oakes exercise,
the courts also may have to determine what other legislation might
better have achieved this hard-to-find goal, as well as the extent
of the detriment individuals affected by the legislation will suffer,
as compared to the good effect it might have on other people,
perhaps a vast majority of the people. In sum, an investigation into
social facts is to be undertaken and the courts might well be one
of the least competent institutions we have to conduct such
inquiries. 40
That is, courts using a purposive approach will be burdened by
difficult tasks which they have never discharged with distinction.
Without replicating Peck's argument in full, it is useful to look
at a few examples to illustrate how judges have done thus far.
The argument is that they have used a variety of approaches. If
this tells us nothing else, it will undermine the claim that there
is a professionally generated set of disciplining rules which constrain
the courts when making decisions under the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, or an approach, whether it be called a purposive approach
or something else, which seriously narrows the results which courts
can legitimately reach.
Item: With Dickson C.J., in Big M, courts have rejected the notion
that a formalistic interpretation of the text of the Charter should
be employed.
Item: In Therens41, a driver was stopped by the police and asked
to provide a blood sample at a police station. He complied. He
had not been advised of his right to counsel, nor had he asked
for a lawyer. LeDain J. held that he had been detained and had
been denied the right to counsel guaranteed by the Charter. LeDain
J. made it plain that he came to his conclusion by reading the
Charter purposively.
Item: LeDain J. held that the freedom to associate did not include
the right to strike.42 In part, his reasoning depended on the fact
that, in guaranteeing "freedom of association", the Charter did not
refer to the right to strike although it could have done so explicitly.
An uncharitable analyst might characterize this approach as the
kind of narrow reading of a text which has been castigated as
formalistic.
Item: McIntyre J., in the same right to strike cases, also held that,
as freedom to associate did not specifically include the right to
strike, it was not meant to be included. This reading, which might
40 For all of this, and more, see S.Peck, "An Analytical Framework for the
Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1987), 25
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1.
41 R. v. Therens (1985), 18 D.LR (4th) 655.
42 Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta), [1987] 1 S.C.R.
313; Public Service Alliance of Canada (P.S.A.C.) v. R, in Right of Canada,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; Retail Wholesale and Department Store Union
(R WD.S.U.) Locals 544, 496, 635 and 955 v. Government of Saskatchewan,
[1987 1 S.C.R. 460.
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be seen as formalistic, was supplemented by an explicitly purposive
reading to the effect that freedom of association could only exist
to enhance the rights of individuals which individuals could exercise
lawfully as such.43 In this respect, he used a similar approach, a
purposive one, to that used by Dickson C.J. and Wilson J., the
dissentients in these cases. But they concluded that the right to
strike was meant to be included lest the purpose for which workers
normally associate would be negated. Are these flatly contradictory
conclusions not symptomatic of how untrue it is to argue that a
purposive reading will yield a range of different, but equally
acceptable, results?
Item: Dickson C.J., in the fight to strike cases, held that the legislature
might be justified in restricting the right to strikeof workers in some
situations. In the Saskatchewan Dairy Workers case he held that
the effect of the strike on third parties was detrimental enough
to justify the government's back-to-work legislation. The fact that
the employers and the affected segment of the public largely
overlapped was of no concern to him. He was not interested in
piercing the corporate veil of the co-operative, the third party
disadvantaged by the strike. Wilson J., his fellow dissentient, chided
him for this narrow approach. That is, in her view, it seems as
if Dickson C.J.'s reasoning was both acceptably purposive and
unacceptably formalistic.
Item: Southam and Big M are the classic purposive reading cases.
In coming to the view that both privacy and religious freedom were
fundamental rights offended by governmental action in those cases,
the Supreme Court of Canada stressed the historically recognized
importance of those rights to human beings.44 Nowhere in the
argument in Southam is there anything which suggests that privacy
might not be applicable to corporations, as opposed to human beings.
Yet, in the United States, the Supreme Court already had held that
privacy and confidentiality are not notions which apply to the
financial records of corporations.45 Is the alluding to history but
not reading it in context the essence of the purposive interpretation
approach? Was it purposive to extend these rights to legal, but
non-human, persons, or was it a formalistic reading of a text which
does not make it clear that words like "individual" and "person"
might have variegated meanings?
43 In Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [ 198911 S.C.R. 143. McIntyre
J. specifically refers to his reasoning in the right to strike cases as being
of the same nature as that which Dickson C.J. described as purposive in
Big M, supra note 37.
44 In Southam, supra note 38, it was stated that the purpose of the Charter
is to protect "the public's interest" (at p. 652), and "the right of the individual"
(at p. 653). In Big M, supra note 37, Dickson C.J, said that religious freedom
is "founded in respect for the inherent dignity and inviolable rights of the
human person" (353).
45 Bellis v. United States 417 U.S. 85 (1974). For an elaboration of this argument
see Petter, "The Politics of the Charter" (1986), 8 Sup. Ct. LR 473.
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Item: In Southam, the purposive reading by the Supreme Court of
Canada led it to the conclusion that the government had violated
the privacy right of the corporation when it tried to compel it to
give up its documents without obtaining proper approval from an
independent reviewer. In Hufsky46, the Supreme Court of Canada
held that the random checking by the police of motor vehicle drivers
and then compelling the detained drivers to produce their licenses
and insurance policies was not an invasion of privacy of the kind
that was meant to be protected by s. 8 of the Charter. The Supreme
Court of Canada gave no reason whatsoever as to why this
interference with a human being was not as much an invasion of
privacy as the conduct affecting a corporation which was found
to offend s.8 in Southam.
Item: In Canadian Union of Postal Workers47, an Alberta Court of
Queen's Bench held that the searching of employees, of their
belongings and of their lockers by their governmental employer,
Canada Post, without obtaining proper approval from anyone, did
not constitute an unacceptable invasion of privacy as the public
interest demanded that such precautions be taken in respect of letters
and parcels entrusted to Canada Post. This seemed to be a purposive
reasoning, but the court also found that, unlike the corporation in
Southam, a trade union was too distinct from a human being to
have standing to complain about Charter violations.
Item: In Reference Re s. 94 (2) of the Motor Vehicle Act 48 the Supreme
Court of Canada gave as one of its reasons for not looking at
the debates surrounding the drafting of the Charter that it was too
difficult to discern the intent and purpose of a particular provision
in that way, although in this case there was, in fact, not much
doubt about what the drafters had intended. Was this a formalistic
or a purposive reading? A better reason given by the Court for
the approach it took was that to look back to the drafters' intentions
would result in the Charter's provision being frozen in time, incapable
of being moulded to social circumstances which did not pertain
at the time of enshrinement. This reason for refusing to look at
the drafters' intentions clearly left room for a purposive approach
to be used in the future. In the case before it, the Supreme Court
of Canada had to give the phrase "principles of fundamental justice",
found in s.7, meaning. Using what the Court obviously deems to
be a purposive interpretative approach, the rest of the Charter was
looked at to do this. As the legal rights found in s. 8-13 already
granted procedural rights, it was held that s. 7 must be seeking
to grant substantive safeguards, although the history of the section
indicated otherwise. The Court, therefore, concluded that the phrase
"principles of fundamental justice" was to be given a substantive
46 R, v. Hufsky (1988), 84 N.R. 365.
47 Canadian Union of Postal Workers, Calgary Local No. 710, Canadian Union
of Postal Workers and David Weale, v. Canada Post Corporation (1987),
53 Alta L 121 (Q.B.).48 (1985), 24 D.LR (4th) 536.
1989
Charter of Rights & Freedoms
meaning. But, the problem which remained was that what was
involved in the notion "substantive rights" was not revealed any-
where in the Charter. This did not phase the Court. It held that
the principles of fundamental justice could be found by reference
to "the basic tenets of our legal system." 49 In the case before the
Court, the legislative attempt to punish persons who did not have
the requisite intent to do harm was held to be a violation of s.7.
The fact that there was a public interest in having unlicensed drivers,
whether or not they knew about their lack of a license, off the
road, could not justify such a breach. Presumably this basic tenet
of the legal system - that there must be a requisite intent in these
kinds of cases - was something which the judiciary could find
by reference to the aggregate of pronouncements, decisions and
practices of judges over time. Presumably these were more easily
discoverable than the intent, spirit and purposes of legislators who
wrote the Charter so recently and/or, presumably, reliance on the
well-established judicial tenets was less likely to freeze the inter-
pretation ofthe Charter than was reliance on the Charter's drafters'
intent.
Item: In Vaillancourt5° , it was decided that the old felony-murder
rule offended s. 7 of the Charter because it denied life, liberty and
security of the person without the Crown having to establish mens
rea. The principles of fundamental justice were violated by this
rule. That is, the "basic tenets of the legal system" were violated,
even though courts had created the felony-murder rule in question
and had upheld it for generations.
In the right to strike cases, the Supreme Court of Canada had
argued that one of the reasons that freedom of association did not
include the right to strike was that no such right had been established
by the judges over time.
Does any of this suggest that finding the "basic tenets of our
legal system" is easier than discovering the meaning of "principles
of fundamental justice"? Does it help to say that the Supreme Court
of Canada has been reading the Charter purposively in these cases?
Item: In two recent contempt of court cases 51, the Supreme Court
of Canada held that the issuance of an injunction by a judge to
prevent a contempt of court was the act of a government official
which could be subjected to judicial scrutiny under the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. In Dolphin52, it was decided that the granting
of an injunction by a judge to restrain an interference with com-
mercial relations was not the act of a governmental official subject
to judicial review under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Are
49 Id, per Lamer J., 550.
50 Vaillancourt v. The Queen, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636.
51 British Columbia Government Employees'Union v. Attorney General of British
Columbia, Attorney General of Canada (1988), 88 C.L.L.C. 14,047; New-
foundland Association of Public Employees v. Attorney General for New-
foundland (1988), 88 C.L.L.C. 14,046.
52 Supra note 11.
VOL 9
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice
such purposive readings likely to lead to minor, tolerable incon-
sistencies, or might they bring the administration of justice into
disrepute?
Item: In the two contempt of court cases, part of the reasoning
was that the phrase "rule of law" in the Charter's preamble had
to be interpreted in such a way as to colour the application of
the real provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The
preamble, of course, is a statement of the intent of the drafters,
not thought to be very useful by the Supreme Court of Canada
in the Reference the Motor Vehicle Act case and by courts when
interpreting mere statutes. In any event, the "rule of law" phrase
is part of a longer sentence in the Charter's preamble, a sentence
which, in full, reads: "Whereas Canada is founded upon principles
that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law." 53 As
far as can be gauged, the Supreme Court of Canada was not troubled
by this part of the preamble when, in reading "freedom of conscience
and religion" purposively in Big M, it found that a statute which
forced stores to close on God's day of rest violated the Charter.
The point of all this is not that the differing kinds of reasoning
used by the courts and the results reached cannot be rationalized.
Lawyers are good at that. They might argue that there are a range
of reading techniques which make sense and that judges can choose
between them without doing violence to the notion that there is
a set of internally generated professional interpretative tools which
discipline the judiciary. In addition to this argument, or as an
alternative to it, lawyers might reason that the selection of a
formalistic, or a selective historical reading, or any other such
intellectually barren approach, are just tools which allow judges
to give a purposive reading to the Charter. But, these kinds of
explanations are not satisfactory. Inasmuch as they are posited on
the argument that the interpretation mechanisms leave the judges
free to choose between, say, reading the text by ignoring the drafters'
known intentions (Reference Motor Vehicle case), relying on the
drafters' intention as stated in the preamble (contempt of court
cases) or ignoring the drafters' intention as stated in the preamble
(Big M), reading it purposively so as to give a privacy right to
all persons, including corporations (Southam), reading it purposively
so as to deny a privacy right to a real person (Hufsky), using
"expressio-unius" type reading to deny workers the right to strike,
reading the text broadly, so as to include citizenship as a protected
ground, even though it is not listed in s. 15 (Andrews) 54, reading
the text purposively by relying on the French version rather than
the English version (Collins)55, etc., it is clear that, by preferring
53 Emphasis added.
54 Supra note 43.
55 [19871 1 S.C.R. 265.
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one technique over another, differing results with contrasting impacts
may be reached by different judges on any one set of facts. This
is fatal to the proponents of the Charter who want to argue that
the judges are subject to a set of internally generated professional
rules which will hold them accountable, precisely because, given
the acceptability of all of these readings, there is no sensible way
to say that one result is better than another without using external
criteria.
A similar difficulty is left by the other explanation on offer.
Inasmuch as it is reasoned that courts are trying to get to a particular
result because of their understanding of the Charter's purpose and
that, in order to do this, they select amongst the interpretative
techniques available, the question remains: how do judges decide
what kind of a result is warranted or, more directly, what constitutes
a defensible purposive reading? There is nothing in the Charter
which assists in this regard. The ugly spectre is raised: an unac-
countable 61ite might make it up as it goes along.56 Hence, the
argument becomes that courts get or should get their direction from
their understanding of the nation's political consensus. What will
inform judges in developing this understanding? It is only if an
answer to this question can be given which shows that the indications
and criteria judges use, or should use, resonate with our democratic
institutions and aspirations and with our agreed-upon views on basic
rights and freedoms, that the critique that leaving decision-making
about fundamental political issues to judges is anti-democratic, can
be rejected. Unsurprisingly, many directives as to what criteria the
courts should use are offered. I will content myself by referring,
briefly, to what I believe are the three most interesting and complete
efforts.
Beatty argues that courts have an obligation to ensure certain
substantive outcomes on the basis that certain kinds of existing
disadvantages connote a lack of respect for the dignity of individuals
which no truly democratically just society, such as Canada, can
continue to tolerate. Thus, according to him, mandatory retirement
is clearly wrong, as is the failure to give all workers the same
kind of collective bargaining rights as all others. He further argues
that, inasmuch as courts fail to reach such results, their decisions
will be wrong, rather than merely a less desirable outcome than
others which might have been reasonably reached by the courts
on the facts. 57 Monahan has argued that courts should read the
Charter not to provide substantive rights but so as to give the
Canadian people more participatory rights. In this way their in-
fluence will be greater and our democratic practices enhanced.
Intriguingly, our most undemocratic institution is to help perfect
56 As Wilson J. noted in her article "Approaches to Judicial Review," supra
note 13, 373. "What are judges to do? How should judges exercise their
power to make the Constitution? ... While parliamentary supremacy is
far from dead, it is certainly severely wounded".
5' Beatty, Putting the Charter to Work- Designing a Constitutional Labour Code
(1987).
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those institutions which, notionally, are designed to let people
participate in decision-making but which have failed to deliver the
goods. 58 Wilson J. has suggested that the judges should try to put
themselves into the position of the least advantaged of our society
and then purposively read the Charter to take these people's needs
into account. 59 These are very sophisticated arguments and I hope
that this summary does not do them too great an injustice, even
though its brevity necessarily leads to distortion. In the end, however,
inasmuch as they are prescriptions for judges as to how they are
to read the Charter lest, in the absence of adherence to some such
prescription, the courts will become uncontrolled usurpers of such
democratic institutions as we have and, thereby, erect barriers to
the development of a better democracy, they are unsatisfactory. 60
This is so, because:
i) Over the centuries, courts have never behaved in a manner which
suggests that they could, or would ever want to, do any of the
things recommended by these theorists;
ii) Thus far, armed with the Charter, the courts have not read
the Charter so as to give Beatty, Monahan or Wilson much hope
that their vision, or anything like it, has been taken up by thejudiciary.
It is largely due to this that Charter proponents have made so much
of the promising language in cases like Morgentaler and Andrews
and of some of the dissents in other cases;
iii) No matter which of these visions of how the Charter should
be read is accepted by courts - if any - as Bakan notes, it will
involve them in making political decisions. The criteria to make
substantive outcomes fit Beatty's view of a world which pays the
right amount of respect to all individuals are not self-suggesting,
nor are those which will help courts to discern what kinds of
procedural rights will enhance participatory political rights to perfect
a particular kind of democracy. Amongst other problems with the
latter argument, there is no agreed-upon definition of democracy;
like s.2 Charter rights, democracy is an open-textured idea. As for
viewing the world through the eyes of the disadvantaged, it is difficult
to believe that enough of them will be able to get access often
58 Supra note 4.
59 Supra note 13, 375 et seq. For a more sophisticated working-out of this
position, see Minow, "The Supreme Court 1986 Term; Foreward: Justice
Engendered" (1987), 101 Harv. LR 10.
60 For the best critical analysis of these theories of Charter interpretation and
potential, an analysis which reveals that, no matter how sophisticated these
theorists' work is, eventually it has to admit that judges are going to have
to make political choices and that only exhortation is available to ensure
that they will stay within the confines which the theorists claim will stop
them from being usurpers of our democratic rights, see, Joel Bakan,
"Constitutional Arguments: Interpretation and Legitimacy in Canadian
Constitutional Thought" (1989), 27 Osgoode Hall LJ. 123; "Partiality and
Legitimacy in Constitutional Theory", Paper presented at Uni. of Toronto
Legal Theory Workshop, Nov. 1, 1988; "Book Review Monahan and Beatty"
(unpublished, available on request).
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enough to be heard61, or that judges will be able to transcend the
views, attitudes and ideology which their alliance with, and often
membership of, the dominant classes has given them. While it is
hardly worth spending any time on the proposition that judges,
especially at the superior court levels, come from the ranks of those
who serve the wealthy and may be expected to share their vision
of society, a brief reference to a recent study by Michael Ornstein
is warranted. 62 He undertook a large survey of the ideology 63 of
segments of the Canadian population. One of the segments was
constituted by senior partners of the largest Canadian law firms
ranked by size. The practice of these law firms was largely corporate
law. Some of the questions put to the respondents through the survey
were designed to elicit the depth of civil libertarianism of the
respondents. The lawyers' group was one of the two most anti-
civil libertarian groups in respect of each of the questions put in
this context. Thus, lawyers, when compared to big business ex-
ecutives, to small business leaders, to federal, state, and municipal
elected politicians and civil servants, and to trade union leaders,
were the group: (i) most opposed to legislation which would support
homosexuals against discrimination; and (ii) most opposed to
legislation which would eliminate existing provincial censor boards.
They comprised the second most opposed group (after municipal
civil servants) to the abolition of the War Measures Act. Finally,
lawyers ranked only behind big business and small business people
in their desire for more cut-backs in social welfare programmes
and in their support for the existing (mal-) distribution of wealth.
While the ideology of senior partners in large corporate-type law
firms is not determinative of the social attitudes of all lawyers,
it is likely that appellate judges have more in common with these
kinds of lawyers than they have with the popular sectors of society.
A variety of studies has shown that appellate court judges have
had close ties and relations with the dominant political parties, have
never been trial judges, that is, have come straight out of practice
to the superior court benches and, until recently, that for every
61 Petter has made the very good point that one of the difficulties created
by the Charter is that only rich people can afford to fight judicial battles
consistently through to the exalted height of appellate courts. As a result,
a disproportionate number of rich people, and corporations, will have their
cases heard by the superior courts. As a consequence, the wealthy's view
of the world will come to be seen (by a judiciary which already is inclined
this way), as the "natural" perspective on the way the world is; see supra
note 45.
62 Michael Ornstein, "Canadian Capital and the Canadian State: Ideology in
an Era of Crises", in Robert J. Brym (ed.), The Structure of the Canadian
Capitalist Class (1985) 129. This particular survey was part of a larger
project entitled "Social Change in Canada" which was conducted by the
Institute for Behavioral Research at York University.
63 Ornstein, id., 141, writes that "the term [ideology] is used ... to denote
an ensemble of political attitudes which, taken together, define the rela-
tionship among capital, the working class, and the state."
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three people appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada, two have
come from the corporate-commercial side of practice for every
one who came from the criminal-civil libertarian side.64 Moreover,
the ideology of the profession is very much that of the 61ite of
the profession. Without question that 61ite is to be found in the
blue ribbon corporate law firms. Elsewhere, Reuben Hasson and
I have shown how the blue ribbon law firms' views are reflected
in, and pervade, legal education and how they set much of the
agenda for academic research.65 In sum, it is somewhat naive to
believe that judges will be able to internalize the views of the nature
of Canadian society offered them by the disadvantaged on the rare
occasions on which they come before the superior courts, especially
as the poor and the oppressed often will be asking for something
unusual: the upholding of protective legislation and/or the estab-
lishment of positive measures. Judges are not only inclined to share
the concerns of the wealthy but they are also wedded to the creed
of the individual rather than that of the collective; they feel more
comfortable striking down legislation, rather than upholding it and
creating positive schemes (even if they felt they had that kind of
jurisdiction). 66 The proof is in the pudding. While social welfare
claimants have not yet reached the Supreme Court of Canada 67,
Reuben Hasson has shown how badly they have fared at trial and
lower appellate court levels. 68
The crux of the argument, then, is that the very way that the
Charter proponents defend the shifting of decision-making power
from somewhat accountable institutions, such as legislatures, to the
democratically unaccountable judiciary, is harmful to their case.
64 See Dennis Olsen, The State Elite, (1980), ch.3. It is very likely growing
knowledge of these data which has led to the agitation aimed at finding
better ways of appointing judges to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
advent of the Charter, and the need to legitimate the decision-making which
it is to yield, present problems if the public perceives the judiciary as coming
from the ranks of the dlite.
65 Glasbeek and Hasson, "Some Reflections on Canadian Legal Education"
(1987), 50 Modern L Rev. 777.
66 R.A. Hasson, supra note 24. As to the question of creating positive
programmes, the issue is rarely confronted by courts. But, in a recent aside,
the Court of Appeal of Ontario comprised by some of the more progressive
members of the court, offered an insight into the general approach of courts:
"Public funding of day care facilities is a social problem which is beyond
the reach of the court," per Dubin A.C.J.O., writing on behalf of himself,
Houlden and Tarnopolsky J.J.A. in Regina v. King (1988), 50 D.L.R. (4th)
564, 569.
67 Underlining the point made earlier in the text that the most common vision
of the world which will be presented to the judges will be that of the wealthier
segments of our population, see supra note 61.
68 R.A. Hasson, "What's Your Favourite Right? The Charter and Income
Maintenance Legislation", (1989), 5 Jo. Law and Social Policy 1.
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The anti-people, anti-progressive and what is, from the Charter
proponents' perspective, the incoherent nature of the decision-
making which has characterized the jurisprudence thus far, draws
unwelcome attention to the fact that the Charter has been promoted
by advocates and sellers as opposed to rational and objective
appraisers, and that it is unlikely that the judiciary will be trans-
formed into an agency which enhances democracy and which
protects the weak from the strong. The reason that the Charter
proponents have to confront these unpleasant facts is that their
selling and defending of the Charter and of thejudicial methodologies
which are to be used to interpret it have ignored that:
(a) the enshrinement of the Charter had a specific political history;
and
(b) the judiciary has an historic role to play, one to which it
should be expected to be faithful as it goes about the task
of interpreting the Charter. Not paying attention to this is
all the more surprising because the Supreme Court of Canada
showed how conscious it was of its political role during the
constitution-making process which led to the enactment of
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Once it is recognized that, while the judiciary does have a role
to play, it is not one which is geared at creating a better, gentler
and kinder and more democratic world, the decision-making which
has emerged does become coherent. That is, it turns out that, just
as the Charter proponents claim, but cannot prove because of the
yardstick they use, judges are not such poor craftspeople and they
engage in the capricious venting of their personal biases less often
than many critics claim. Paradoxically, it was the portrayal of the
judiciary as an agent for change when it became armed with the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms which has created, and continues
to create, most of the difficulties for the Charter's proponents'
arguments. The next section of the paper sets out to demonstrate
that the judiciary, as an institution, understands that the Charter
has at least one specific political purpose. Further, the idea will
be to show that the judiciary's decisions in other areas can be viewed
as consistent with the courts' traditional role of defending capitalist
relations of production. That is, there is purposive reading out there,
but the purposes pursued are not the ones which Charter proponents
identify.
III. The Contents of the Charter
(a) Language Rights
While there were many factors which led to the enshrinement
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms69, there is no doubt that
a very, if not the most, important impetus was the need felt by
the federal government to end the threat posed by Quebec
nationalism.
69 For a listing, see Glasbeek and Mandel, supra note 9.
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As Weiler noted:
[S]ecuring minority language rights was the principle motivation for
Prime Minister Trudeau's making the Charter the centrepiece of his
project for constitutional renewal of Canadian federalism. 70
And Russell wrote:
The political purposes of the Charter can be thought of as falling
into two general categories. These two kinds of purposes are ...
closely related, although analytically distinct. The first has to do
with national unity and the Charter's capacity to offset, if not reverse,
the centrifugal forces which some believe threaten the survival of
Canada as a unified country. This national unity function of the
Charter is most relevant to explaining why politicians, especially
those who led the federal government, pushed so hard for a Charter.7
The Quiet Revolution caused Canada, and more directly the
dominant political economic groups in Canada, the anglophone
business 61ite, to have to face an increasing number of militant
demands by Quebec's French-speaking majority. Francophone
Quebecers were disadvantaged in their economic and their working
life. Overwhelmingly they constituted the non-propertied portion
of the population. The demands for change which were encouraged
as the Quiet Revolution took hold were, therefore, not just linguistic
rights as such 72, but also cultural preservation claims as well as
social and economic demands. It was the strategy of Trudeau which
was to emerge as the dominant means with which to counter these
trends.
It was his idea that English Canada should accept that French
was one of the two founding languages, equal in all respects to
English. This meant that the federal government and the anglo
70 Supra note 15, 55.
71 Peter H. Russell, "The Political Purposes of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedom" (1983), 61 Cant B. Rev. 30, 31. Trudeau himself had made
it clear that that was what he saw as the virtue of enacting a constitutional
bill of rights; see The Constitution and the People of Canada (1969). For
the most perceptive analysis of the fight around Quebec and the introduction
of minority language rights into the Charter see Michael Mandel, The Charter
of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada, (1989). See also Trent
"Common Ground and Disputed Territory" in R. Simeon (ed.), Must Canada
Fail? (1977), 139.
72 Although there was a great danger to the survival of the French language
in both Quebec and in Canada generally; see Beaugot, "A Demographic
View on Canadian Language Policy" (1979), 5 Can. Pub. Policy 16;
Vaillancourt, "La Charte de la langue Francaise du.Quebec", (1978) 4 Car.
Pub. Policy 284. See also Mandel, supra note 71. For anyone who doubts
how radical the movement for change was, it is worth referring to "The
Second Front", The Report of Marcel Pepin, National President to the
Convention of the CNTU, Oct. 13, 1968, which vigorously attacked capitalist
relations of production, and to the manifesto of working class independistes
who wanted a different world altogether, "Ne Comptons Que Sur Nos Propres
Moyens/We Can Rely Only on Our Own Means"; see Black Rose Books
Editorial Collective, Quebec Labour (2nd ed) (1975), 9.
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provinces should accord French speaking minorities under their
jurisdiction the right to use their language in the fullest sense possible,
that is, in their dealings with governments, the courts and, where
numbers warranted it, in educational settings. The trade-off would
be that the English minority in Quebec would be given similar
rights. That is, Trudeau sought to characterize, and succeeded in
having a majority of political leaders accept the characterization
of, the Quebec "problem" as one which was not primarily concerned
with national aspirations, but rather as a much more narrow one,
one which had to do with the preservation of the French language
in Quebec and in Canada.
The difficulty with the Trudeau strategy was that, while the federal
government could implement it, and did, by protecting francophones
in the courts and in federal government bureaucracies, the provinces
were not bound to do so. Constitutional amendment was needed.
This became all the more urgent after the Parti Quebecois came
to power and began its drive for independence. To head this off,
the federal government was joined by the political leaderships of
all the provinces. They worked hard to achieve the defeat of the
PQ's referendum on sovereign association. The major political
promise made to the Quebecois to persuade them to vote "No"
was that they would be offered a new constitutional arrangement,
one in which Quebec's aspirations would be better defined and
respected than ever before. After the defeat of the referendum,
however, politicians, other than the Trudeau Liberals, lost a great
deal of interest in the constitutional process.
In order to deliver, the federal government deliberately tied the
obtaining of an enshrined Charter of Rights and Freedoms to the
patriation and amendment of the Constitution. It was felt that
provincial leaderships could not be seen to object to the enshrinement
of a Charter of Rights. Milne 73 found a secret memorandum prepared
for the federal negotiators' use at the constitutional conferences.
It read as follows:
The strategy on the People's Package is really very simple. The
federal positions on the issues within the package are clearly very
popular with the Canadian public and should be presented on
television in the most favourable light possible. The Premiers who
are opposed should be put on the defensive very quickly and should
be made to appear that they prefer to trust politicians rather than
impartial and non-partisan courts in the protection of the basic rights
of citizens in a democratic society. It is evident that the Canadian
people prefer their rights protected by judges rather than by
politicians. 74
13 D. Milne, The New Canadian Constitution (1982), 221-2. This echoed the
strategy set out by Trudeau as early as 1967 in a speech given to the Canadian
Bar Association and as set out in his own writing, Federalism and the French
Canadians (1968), 54-5 8.
74 The People's Package referred to what is now the Charter. This seductive
title is indicative of the nature of the strategem.
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Embedded in the People's Package, which it was hoped would be
irresistible, were a series of provisions on minority language rights
which set out the federal government's strategy on the issue which,
by itself, might not have been very attactive. That is, the use of
the constitutionalization of rights was integral to the plan designed
to ward off the nationalist movement in Quebec.
The courts have understood this from the beginning. Indeed, they
played a crucial part in furthering the tactics devised by the federalist
forces. In Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution75, the Supreme
Court of Canada was asked whether or not the federal government,
as a matter of law, unilaterally could ask the U.K. Parliament to
amend the Canadian constitution. The Supreme Court of Canada
obviously had to answer that question and it answered it: "Yes".
But the court also did something quite unprecedented: it answered
the question as to whether or not there was a convention requiring
agreement by the provinces to any such federal request. That it
was unusual for the court to indulge itself in answering this kind
of question can be seen from some of the academic commentary
it produced by the likes of Hogg who wrote that the Supreme Court
of Canada acted "outside its legal function and to facilitate the
political outcome". 76 In the result, a majority of the Supreme Court
of Canada held that there was a convention requiring the federal
government to obtain provincial approval but that all that was
required was that a substantial majority of the provinces support
the federal government's decision. This had an immense impact
on the dealing and wheeling which was to take place immediately
afterwards. 77 For the purposes of this discussion, all that is important
is that the Court did not say specifically that it was necessary for
Quebec to be part of the substantial majority for the federal
government's proposed course of action to be constitutionally valid.
Quebec was treated as a province just like any other. This, of course,
was the essence of the minority language rights' strategy offered
by the Trudeau government: no province should be able to act
as a sovereign entity any more than any other province. Indeed,
when Quebec came back to the court to make the argument that,
whatever substantial majority meant, it required that any such
majority should include Quebec, an argument of some historical
force given the foundation of Canada and Quebec, the Supreme
Court of Canada rejected this reasoning. 78 That is:
(i) The Supreme Court of Canada played a vital political role
in a constitutional process which was to give it immensely greater
judicial review power than it ever had had before. Ironically, one
75 Supra note 9.
76 P.W. Hogg, "Comments on Legislation and Judicial Decisions - Consti-
tutional Law" (1982), 60 Can, Bar Rev. 307, 314.
77 See Glasbeek and Mandel, supra note 9; see Hogg, supra note 76, 323;
Kay "Courts as Constitution-Makers in Canada and the United States"
(1982), 4 Sup. Ct L Rev. 23, 24.
78 Re Attorney-General Quebec and Attorney- General Canada (1982), 140 D.L.R.
(3d) 385 (S.C.C.).
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of the reasons later to be offered for granting it such new powers
was that it was not a political actor subject to the whims and wills
of occasional majorities;
(ii) The Supreme Court of Canada was a central political actor
in a constitutional process which was geared at supporting a status
quo which was highly contentious in Quebec. In so doing, the
Supreme Court of Canada was supportive of the political programme
associated with a powerful 61ite. 79
Unsurprisingly, once the Charter was enshrined, the courts were
pivotal in nailing down the federalist, anti-Quebec nationalism
circumstance it had helped create.
Section 23 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a most detailed
section, one which was deliberately written to controvert Quebec's
Bill 101, a Charter of French Language Rights, which had been
aimed at controlling the language of education in Quebec. Not only
is s. 23 not subject to s. 33, making it clear that minority language
rights were the focus of the constitution-making process, but it is
not abstractly written as are other supposed fundamental rights and
freedoms in the Charter such as, say, "freedom of religion". That
is, the judiciary was given rather specific instructions as to how
it ought to interpret minority language rights. The judges took their
cue very well.
In the Quebec Protestant School Board's case 80, the Supreme Court
of Canada held that Bill 101's limitations on English-language
education rights offended the Charter. The Court did not accept
Quebec's argument that a limitation on (contrast denial of) the
language of education rights of English-speaking people was a
reasonable one in a free and democratic society such as Quebec.
It felt that, having found a s. 23 violation, it did not have to consider
s. 1 of the Charter. It read Bill 101 not as a limitation on an entrenched
right, but as a denial thereof, and, therefore, indefensible. Both the
result in the case and the tenor of the Court's opinion showed that
the Court was adhering closely to the plan devised to keep Quebec,
as a province with a large English minority, within the confines
of Canada. Other decisions reflected the same approach. For
instance, the Manitoba French minority which had been unable
to win anything by way of language rights for 90 years, was able
to obtain a favourable decision, one which fitted in with the notion
that it was appropriate to compel Quebec to treat its anglophones
well, as long as English provinces with French minorities were
treated similarly.8'
79 This was not, of course, the first time that the courts had shown their
willingness to help tame the national aspirations of Quebec; see Attorney-
General Quebec v. Blaikie (1979), 101 D.L.R. (3d) 394 (S.C.C.).
80 Attorney-General Quebec v. Quebec Protestant School Boards, [1984] 2 S.C.R.
66.
81 Reference Re Language Rights under the Manitoba Act 1870 (1985), 19 D.L.R.
(4th) 1 (S.C.C.). The decision was remarkable for the judicial methodology
used. The Supreme Court of Canada found that the unilingual Manitoba
laws were invalid because they did not abide by the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms' requirements. As this would have created instant chaos, the
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More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the
Quebec law which prohibits use of commercial signs in English
offended the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.82 Again, the Court
had to assert that Quebec's majority, which might win the day in
a democratic sovereign nation, could not be respected as long as
Quebec was a province like any other in Canada. The nature and
the extent of the political fallout of that decision cannot be gauged
yet, but it is already significant.83 For a while, the apparent
quiescence of the Quebec separation movement had allowed the
Supreme Court of Canada to become more "practical" in its reading
of language rights.84 It had come to rely on rather narrow textual
readings to avert political inconvenience to some of the provinces,
while urging them to set their houses up better so as to protect
French minority language rights.85 But, that kind of self-satisfied
lenience could not be extended when it was the English minority
in Quebec which was the claimant that its language rights were
being oppressed by a French majority, as was the case in the
commercial signs' case. The Supreme Court of Canada returned
to the plan which it had helped devise. 86
Supreme Court of Canada decided that the laws would remain enforceable
until they could be translated. To hold something which is constitutionally
offensive to be the law of the. land required a trick. The Court produced
something called state necessity doctrine. Who says that courts are unable
to use their imagination or, alternatively, who says that courts are disciplined
by some set of internally generated professional interpretative techniques?!
82 Ford v. Attorney General of Quebec, supra note 13.
83 In response to the decision, s. 33 was used by a reluctant Bourassa government
so that a bill which decreed that English commercial signs could be controlled
would be beyond the reach of the Charter. This has created a backlash
with two main strands to it. First, Quebec's willingness to challenge the
Charter-imposed language policy has given rise to the fear that, after all,
the policies which seemed to have worked so well for a while may not
last the course. National, rather than mere language aspirations, are still
shown to be very strong, strong enough to have to be respected by a Liberal
Party Premier whose government had shown itself to be quite happy with
the language policies embedded in the Charter, supplemented by the "distinct
society" phraseology of the Meech Lake Accord. If that "distinct society"
phrase comes to be perceived as an empty one, Quebec's nationalist forces
are likely to be given a boost. The second reaction is that the use of s.
33 forced upon the Bourassa government was seen not only as a reaffirmation
of Quebec's cantankerousness, but also as a resurgence of democratic
impulses which are not to be tolerated. Calls for repeal of s. 33 abound;
supra note 14. Recourse to the Charter is said to be enough of a democratic
right, especially when such democratic rights are sought to be exercised
by the people of Quebec.
84 Bilodeau v. A.G. Manitoba, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 449; MacDonald v. City of
Montreal, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460. These cases involved the constitutional
language rights found outside the Charter. See also R. v. Mercure, [1988]
1 S.C.R. 234.
85 See M. Mandel supra note 71, for this particular insight and, indeed, for
the best legal discussion of the language rights' issue available. The discussion
in the text relies heavily on it.
86 Ford v. Attorney-General of Quebec, supra note 13.
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In sum, the courts have played a major part in the implementation
of state strategies in respect of the Quebec language rights' issue
at a time when it has been extremely difficult for elected politicians,
acting within serious jurisdictional limitations, to be effective. When
applying the Charter in respect of language rights, the courts have
acted in tandem with the federalist state and against the Quebec
state. The courts have not acted as an agent independent of the
state, as an institution inserted between the people and the state
to protect the former from the latter: The decision in the language
rights' cases make the claim that the judiciary armed with the Charter
will always act as a guarantor of rights and freedoms of individuals
who are oppressed by the state a somewhat dubious one. Whatever
one's position on the Quebec and language issues, it it foolish to
portray the courts as actors whose only interest is the protection
of minorities overwhelmed by the state. This can only be true if
the English minority and the Quebec state are isolated as the issue;
it is not true if the French-speaking Quebecois and the federal
state are treated as the combatants.
(b) Legal Rules
This category of rights and freedoms found in the Charter is
the most litigated one.87 The legal rules provisions in the Charter
concern themselves largely with procedural matters which affect
the criminal law process. The easy-to-discern objective of these
rules is that people who are the subject of criminal investigation
and processes should be protected from over-zealous prosecutorial
forces and insensitive tribunals and courts. This, of course, is far
from unimportant. A society which treats all its citizens with the
respect which ought to be accorded to free, sovereign individuals,
even those suspected of having transgressed laws devised to protect
other individuals' freedoms, is a better society than one which does
not. Inasmuch as the Charter furthers this objective, its proponents
have reason to believe that a judiciary, armed with the Charter,
can bring about a more civil and better society. And, on the face
of it, our courts have read the legal rules provisions of the Charter
in such a way as to boost that belief.
The courts have been supportive of the rights of prisoners and
parolees. They have held that these people should be entitled to
legal counsel in situations where this right previously had not been
accorded them.88 The Supreme Court of Canada granted a right
to hearings with better procedures to refugees.8 9 Courts have
expanded the protections to be afforded to suspects by throwing
out cases in which there had been undue delay in bringing them
87 See F.L. Morton, "The Political Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms," Canadian Journal of Political Science, March 1987, 31 et
seq.; P. Monahan, supra note 4, 33 et seq.
88 Morin v. National Special Handling Unit Review Committee (1985), 49 C.R.
(3d) 26 (S.C.C.); Re Howard (1985), 45 C.R. (3d) 242 (F.C.A.), appeal
to S.C.C. granted.
89 Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
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to trial90 , or where the manner in which evidence was obtained
is considered to be offensive to our social tenets. There are many
examples of this: a confession obtained from a person who was
extremely drunk was tossed out even though the court believed
her confession to be reliable.9 1 In another case, it was suggested
that for the police to apply a choke-hold to ensure that someone
would not swallow a drug might well be a violation of the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms.92 The failure to offer a detained suspect
the opportunity to telephone a lawyer has been held to be unac-
ceptable behaviour. 93 The court has also struck down legislation
which provided a very high minimum jail sentence; it held that
such inflexibility did not permit of a humanistic approach which
balances the wrong done against the personal characteristics of
the convicted person.94 The Supreme Court of Canada also has
extended the protection attached to incriminating evidence an
accused was forced to give when appearing as a witness in a previous
proceeding 95 ; and so forth.
It is clear that, while not doing so all that elegantly96, courts
have been at pains to expand the area of protection to individuals
who might suffer from over-reaching by the forces of prosecution.
90 Rahey v. R., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588.
91 Clarkson v. R., [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383. But, note that this case might well
have led to the same result in pre-Charter days; see Pohoretsky v. R. [1987
1 S.C.R. 945 for a similar holding.
92 Collins v. R, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265. The uncertainty about the actual holding
suggested in the text is due to the fact that, as in many of these cases,
the Supreme Court of Canada did not decide the case on the merits, sending
it back to trial for more fact-finding. Further, the Supreme Court of Canada
cited, without positive or negative comment on the outcome in the case,
R. v. Cohen (1983), 33 C.R. (3d) 151 (B.C.C.A.), in which the application
of a choke-hold was held not to be a violation of s.24 of the Charter.
93 R v. Manninen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233.
94 Smith v. R, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045.
95 Dubois v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R 350.
96 As argued in n. 92, the actual holding in Collins was not all that illuminating.
Moreover, the reasoning and tests formulated by the Court also left a lot
to be desired; see infra, n. 101. Similarly, in Dubois, id, the Supreme Court
of Canada was forced into arguing that its decision was warranted despite
an apparent Supreme Court of Canada decision (R v. Brown (No. 2), [1963]
S.C.R. VI) to the contrary. The Court said that one could not tell what
the Supreme Court of Canada truly had meant on the earlier occasion.
In R. v. Corbett, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, the Court was both illiberal in its
interpretation and inelegant. The issue was whether prior convictions could
be used to attack the credibility of an accused person. The Supreme Court
of Canada split into many pieces. Two of the justices held that a trial judge
had discretion under the provision which entitled such cross-examination
of a witness and that the provision, therefore, did not offend the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, in particular s. 11 (d); two judges held that a trial
judge had no discretion but that, nonetheless, the provision permitting such
cross-examination did not offend the Charter of Rights and Freedoms' s.1 l(d);
one justice held that the trial judge had discretion as to whether or not
to allow such an attack and that he had exercised it wrongly and, therefore,
the issue of constitutionality did not arise; another judge decided, in a two-
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Yet, the deeper implications of these decisions should not be all
that comforting to the proponents of the Charter. Consider:
(i) These kinds of cases are quintessentially ones in which the
individual is pitted against the potential oppressor, the state. The
state is clearly identified as the villain. This, of course, harmonizes
nicely with the Charter proponents' general argument to the effect
that the judiciary, empowered by the Charter, can act as a buffer
between the potential tyranny of the majority which controls state
power and dissident, non-conformist individuals and minorities. This
notion of the Court as protector is further bolstered by the fact
that many of the suspected and accused people who seek the
protection of the legal rules found in these sections of the Charter
do belong to the classes of the disadvantaged and the oppressed
of our society.
But, the argument should not sway us. After all, to protect these
individuals in this kind of setting is not quite the same thing as
protecting Jehovah Witnesses, Dukhobors, Japanese-Canadians and
Inddpendistes from the tyranny of the state. It was those kind of
people who were suffering the political oppression which formed
the centre of the argument made by the Charter proponents who
claimed that non-conformers and dissidents should be protected
from state power. Indeed, it would have been politically foolish
for those advocates to claim that the Charter was necessitated by
our coercive police forces. As it was, prosecutors and police
commissions objected to what they termed the Americanization
of our law and order system. They predicted that they would be
impeded in their efforts to protect persons and their property. The
argument was that experienced criminals would be able to fetter
investigations and prosecutions by reliance on barren, technical
arguments.
This argument, was, and is, much used in the United States by
opponents of the exclusionary rule fashioned under its Bill of Rights.
Consequently, massive efforts have been made to show that the
U.S. exclusionary rule's procedural safeguards have not interfered
with the catching and convicting of criminals. While the evidence
is somewhat contentious 97, on balance it seems that the exclusionary
rule has had little impact on the number of prosecutions brought;
nor has it led to a substantial change in the success rate of the
sentence judgment, that there was a discretion in a trial judge and that,
if it had not been for that discretion, the provision permitting cross-
examination of an accused witness would offend s. 11(d) of the Charter
and s. 7 of the Charter. One feels sorry for trial judges having to apply
this kind of ruling. This squarely raises the issues as to how useful the
expansive language of respect for rights used by the superior courts in most
of the cases referred to will be when the tests have to be interpreted by
the police and, then, provincial court judges.
97 For a review of the studies, see Morisette, "The Exclusion of Evidence under
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: What to Do and What not
to Do" (1984), 29 McGill LJ 521. Morisette relies on an article by B.
Canon, infra n. 98, for his summation.
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motions to suppress evidence because it was obtained in violation
of the United States' Bill of Rights.98 This, of course, suggests that,
while the language of rights in the criminal process cases may be
much more civil libertarian than it used to be, the practices and
results are not likely to be all that different to those in the bad
old days, the pre-Charter days. If this is true, the argument that
the courts' positive approach to legal rules is a real breakthrough
is to be questioned. It may only be a symbolic breakthrough. It
may say: "We are a society which wants to look as if we are not
totalitarian." 99
(ii) But the impression remains that the existence of the Charter's
legal rules and the courts' willingness to read them so as to provide
better procedural protections to suspected and accused persons
indicates that the judiciary acts as a buffer against state oppression.
This impression gets a boost from another quarter. These cases
and the results in them give lawyers the feeling that they are central
98 B. Canon, "Ideology and Reality in the Debate over the Exclusionary Rule:
A Conservative Argument for its Retention" (1982), 23 S. Texas Law J.
559, cites several studies to this effect. In a study of victimless crimes the
Institute for Law and Social Research showed that only 2% of the cases
examined led to a dropping of a prosecution because it was thought that
the exclusionary rule would make it futile. In a similar study by the Californian
Bureau of Criminal Statistics, in only 2.3% of the cases were charges dropped
because the prosecuting forces thought there were search and seizure
problems. Note also that the Controller-General conducted a study, cited
by Canon, which showed that charges were dropped in a mere 4/10th of
1% of the total number of cases in the survey because of exclusionary rule
problems. This same study also showed that in only 1.3% of the cases was
there a successful suppression motion at trial and, in 50% of those, the
defendant was convicted on the evidence that remained. Canon goes on
to argue for the retention of the exclusionary rule because it hardly affects
conviction rates and it legitimates the police, a point which has significance
for the argument in the text.
99 In a recent case involving our secret service forces, the Federal Court denied
the right of a suspect to have access to files which might exist and which
might have a damaging effect on his life. This was justified by reference
to the needs of the secret service. Of course, the applicant had made Charter
arguments. The fact that they failed raises the spectre of their futility. Muldoon
J., wrote that: "In light of six years' of rhetoric and jurisprudence about
the Charter, some Canadians may shudder to realize that the security needs
of a free and democratic society are, in a few basic essentials, much the
same as those which totalitarian societies arrogate unto themselves. Utter
secrecy, subject to certain checks, in security intelligence matters is one.
That necessary degree of secrecy is so much more fissiparous in freedom
and democracy than it is under the stifling oppression of a totalitarian regime,
and it is therefore objectively justifiable in terms of paragraph 46(1)(b) of
the Privacy Act. What no doubt distinguishes this free and democratic society
from those which are less or not at all so, are the right to apply for, and
obtain the results of, the Privacy Commissioner's investigation, and the right
to apply to this Court for a review." Note that the holding is that the court
application will necessarily fail. Is this the difference between true totali-
tarianism and our system? See Zangeneh v. C.S.I.S. (21 April, 1988), Ottawa
T-2162-87 (Fed.Ct.).
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to the battle of liberalism and liberty in our society. They are
champions of the oppressed. Thus, not only have they been given
a new set of arguments and a means to add to their income, the
Charter has imbued them with the feeling that they have been
recognized as vital political agents. Their articulate support for the
Charter and judicial review is thereby assured. °00 As the Charter
is part of the legal system, and practising lawyers are the experts
of that legal system, their support is of great significance to the
public perception of the Charter. It is of some interest here to note
that the courts have done their best to reinforce the notion that
lawyers are crucial to Charter politics. Thus, while it is yet far
from clear as to when the obtaining of evidence is so offensive
to the Charter's edicts that it ought to be excluded from the trier
of facts' consideration101, it has been made clear by the courts that
the denial of access to a lawyer (unless a suspect or accused
consciously has waived her right to counsel), will lead to the exclusion
of evidence.102
(iii) Neither the police, nor the public, can be certain as to when
the conduct of investigators will violate the Charter. But, however
badly they feel about this, it is likely to be more of a shock to
them to learn that the primary focus of the courts' ruling on this
question is not the protection of suspected or accused persons from
100 An additional boost is given to Charter proponents because it is by far
and away the most progressive members of the profession who are engaged
in this work. See text nn. 62-65. As a result an upside down effect is
achieved, a regrettably predictable consequence when political battles are
brought into the courts. The upside down effect is that it is progressive
lawyers who help identify the state as the villain, even though their clientele
groups are the ones who have the most to gain by enlisting the state as
an ally. This is also true of non-criminal legal aid workers of all kinds.
Their clienteles often are denied entitlement by rigid low level bureaucracies.
Lawyers can now attack them for violating Charter provisions in the
application of benefit-creating schemes. Again, the state, more than before,
is identified as the enemy, although the benefit schemes in issue, more
often than not, are necessitated by the actions of private property owners.
See the discussion in the text, nn. 125-135.
101 See Collins, supra note 92 in which it was held that courts are to balance
the following vague and incommensurable factors: What kind of evidence
was obtained? What Charter right was infringed? Was the Charter violation
serious, technical, flagrant, committed in good faith? Did the circumstances
warrant the action taken or were other means available? Was the offence
with which the accused is charged serious? Was the evidence essential
to substantiate the charge? Are other remedies than exclusion available?
Lamer J.'s judgment seemed to suggest that, if the violation of the Charter
yielded real evidence, exclusion would seldom be required to preserve the
integrity of the administration of justice. The indeterminacy, the lack of
logic and, in the end, the very unclear enunciation of a commitment to
ensure safeguards for suspected and accused persons, despite the rich rhetoric
espousing such a commitment, has drawn some pointed critiques; see, e.g.,
R.J. Delisle, "Collins- An Unjustified Distinction" (1987), 56 C.R. (3d) 216.
102 Manninen supra note 93; Baig v. The Queen (1987), 37 C.C.C. (3d) 181
(S.C.C.).
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the forces of prosecution. The Supreme Court of Canada has held
that the tests to determine whether or not evidence ought to be
excluded because it offends the integrity of the administration of
justice are designed to ensure that courts do not lose their legitimacy
by permitting just any violation of the Charter (unless it is a denial
of access to a lawyer) to lead to an acquittal. 0 3 Manifestly, judges
are conscious of the need to maintain public support, a consciousness
which, no doubt, has been deepened by their new visibility in these
and other Charter-generated cases. At the same time, they feel
confident enough of their new pride of place to use the Charter
to arrogate more power to themselves. 04 Many of the decisions
which Charter proponents might want to portray as the successful
erection of barriers against the potential of state oppression, such
as the setting aside of harsh minimum penalties, do not necessarily
mean that they intend penalties to be less severe than those
contemplated by the legislature. Rather, what the courts did decide
was that the legislatures should be prevented from being so emphatic;
what was contrary to the Charter was not to leave the discretion
to set the penalty to the courts. Thus, while this may result in lower
penalties than the legislation mandated in some cases, it might not
do so very often. 10 5 This is also true of the much-hailed decision
in Vaillancourt. As a result of the abolition of the felony-murder
rule, from now on manslaughter convictions will be registered rather
than convictions for murder in these kinds of cases. But, this does
not mean that the penalty may not be as great as it ever was.
That is, the courts will be substituting their sanctioning power for
that of the state. It takes a leap of faith to believe that this will
lead to more humane treatment of convicted persons. The impression
created - that the courts are legitimate monitors of the police,
that they stand between the state and the disadvantaged - however,
is of great value to Charter and judicial review proponents.
(iv) How misleading this impression truly is can be seen from
the final point to be made in this section. What the Charter's legal
rules provisions do not lead to, no matter how much Charter
proponents talk about the courts' increased protection of the
disadvantaged from the evils practised by the ugly state, is a change
in what kinds of crimes the state will prosecute. Overwhelmingly,
we remain interested in prosecuting those crimes involving personal
violence and the integrity of property which are committed by people
who have no property. The crimes of the rich are largely ignored.'0 6
103 Collins, supra note 92, where, see supra note 101, an impossible-to-apply
set of criteria were spelled out to achieve this purpose.
104 What follows relies on yet another insight obtained from reading M. Mandel,
supra note 71.
105 Indeed, McIntyre J. suggests as much in his dissent in R. v Smith, [1987]
1 S.C.R. 1045, 1082.
106 Glasbeek, "Why Corporate Deviance is not Treated as a Crime - The
Need to Make "Profits" a Dirty Word" (1984), 22 Osgoode Hall LJ. 393;
"The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement - The Latest in Maginot
Lines to Save Capitalism" (1987/88), 11 Dalh. LI. 363.
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The function of criminal law and its enforcement as a disciplinary
force by which to educate the population into an acceptance of
the economic and political status quo 10 7 is not challenged by the
Charter provisions. There is nothing in the Charter, or its inter-
pretation, which compels the state to allocate the resources spent
on criminal investigation and prosecution any differently than it
already does. 10 8 That is, there is nothing in the Charter which tells
us that we should beef up the puny law and order efforts which
we make now to combat the wrongful conduct which leads to
slaughter in the workplace' 0 9, the rape of our environment' 10, the
damage done to the consumers by the knowing manufacture of
shoddily made goods"', and by anti-competitive and deceptive
business practices, the economic costs of which are staggering'12,
and so forth.
In sum, on the face of it, the courts' efforts in respect of the
legal rules' provisions seem to reflect the justificatory arguments
made by Charter proponents. Moreover, this category of Charter
applications permits the courts to hold themselves out as an
institution independent of the state, ready to ward it off on behalf
of the downtrodden. In concrete terms, however, the outcomes
cannot be said to herald a revolutionary change, indeed, not even
107 For the best exposition of this function of criminal law, see M. Foucault,
Discipline and Punish," The Birth of the Prison (1979).
'08 The only real exception to this general statement on the effect of the Charter
on this issue may be Morgentaler (1988), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.).
But, even this requires qualification. Whatever else motivated the judges
to come to the decision they did, one thing is clear: the criminal law provision
which prohibited abortions (except in certain specific circumstances) was
completely unenforceable in Canada. The public knew it, the politicians
knew it, and most of all, the judiciary knew it. Attempts to prosecute Dr.
Morgentaler had failed consistently in Canada. Juries just simply refused
to convict. This was very embarrassing for the courts, undermining the
legitimacy of the law and those courts which tried to insist that an unpopular
law should be enforced. From this perspective, the Supreme Court of
Canada's decision to the effect that the criminal law relating to abortion
was in violation of the Charter was a useful face-saving device. Here it
is important to note that the Court did not say that abortion could not
be criminalized, but simply that it had been done badly. It left the hot
potato as to whether or not abortion should be a criminal offence in the
lap of the legislature.
109 Glasbeek & Rowland, "Are Injuring and Killing at Work Crimes?" (1979),
17 Osgoode Hall LJ. 506.
110 The unpopularity of environmental pollution and workplace suffering has
forced the Law Reform Commission of Canada which in 1976, in Our
Criminal Law, recommended that we should not consider criminalizing this
kind of conduct, to come out with a diametrically opposed view; see
"Workplace Pollution", L.R.C.C. Working Paper No. 53 (1986) and "Crimes
Against the Environment", L.R.C.C. Working Paper No. 44 (1985).
111 The Dalkon-Shield, the Ford Pinto are merely spectacular examples of
a multitude of such activities.
1 12 Goff & Reasons, Corporate Crime in Canada: A Critical Analysis of Anti-
Combines Legislation (1978); Glasbeek, supra note 106.
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a change which suggests that we are a better society. The same
kind of people are still the subject of state investigation and
prosecution; the same number of unemployed, semi-employed,
racially different and native peoples are convicted and jailed. The
wealthy are in no greater peril than ever they were; indeed, as
Southam showed, they may be even safer. If there is a change,
it is a symbolic one and, most importantly, it is one which gives
the courts more legitimacy to carry out the functions described
in the next section.
(c) Section 2 Rights
Section 2 rights and freedoms can be characterized as giving
rights to individuals as such. That is, they are abstract in the sense
of treating individuals as atoms in society. They are rights which
will protect these individuals, these atoms, from intervention by
the larger society to which they belong and from undue trespasses
on them by other individuals, by other atoms. Further, as these
rights and freedoms are to be guaranteed, legal enforcement of
them has had to be assured.
This characterization of the rights and freedoms in s. 2 means
that all individuals possess them, no matter what their history or
class position is. As Hobsbawm noted, all individuals are to be
regarded "like people who have bought a ticket at a standard price
to a movie: never mind who they are, they have the same fight
to a seat."' 13 To liberal proponents of the Charter, this signifies
that all individuals can be protected equally from state oppression.
More, it means that when disadvantaged people make their claims
for better treatment they are able to do so on the basis of the
same universal guarantee of rights which permit the "haves" of
this world to justify their position. That is, their claims cannot be
resisted on some a priori moral-political claims of justifiable
differences. From this perspective, the Charter is treated as a
welcome breakthrough by its liberal proponents.
Even though this reasoning is attractive, the outcomes thus far
are discomforting to those who want to rely on it. It isdifficult
to show that the Charter has contributed to Canadians' political-
legal fights enunciated in s. 2 in any substantive way. For instance,
there is no particular reason to believe that Canadians now have
more free speech rights than they did before the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms was enshrined. In particular, have Canadians won
the right to more public space in which to exercise this right? Have
the owners of the mass communication media given up the almost
total monopoly they have had for a long time on news and opinion
dissemination in this country? 14 On the other hand, it is true that
"3 E. Hobsbawm, Workds of Labour, Further Studies in the History of Labour
(1984); Ch. 17, "Labour and Human Rights", 303. The rest of this section
draws heavily on this marvellous essay.
114 See Glasbeek, supra note 24, where the effect of this monopoly on the
exercise of freedom of speech in Canada is discussed.
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some censoring boards have been curtailed" 15 and that Nazis have
been able to attack restrictive legislation seeking to inhibit the
propagation of hatred.' 16 It is also true that the corporate sector
has been enabled to attack legislative efforts to restrict advertising;
the effects of these attacks are still incalculable. 1'7 Similarly, while
it is still a matter of serious legal contention as to whether or not
a trade union can raise funds for political purposes, a right which
was not challenged before the advent of the Charter 18, there is
no doubt that bodies such as the National Citizens Coalition now
have the freedom to express themselves on political issues, free
that is from the would-be restrictions of electoral financing leg-
islation. 19 Or, in another sphere, there seems to be no evidence
that Canadians enjoy more freedom of religion than theyever did.
Certainly, one group of serious people whose religion dictated that
their children should undergo a non-conformist school experience
were denied this right to exercise their strongly and sincerely held
religious preference.' 20 Is this anti-religious freedom holding offset
by the fact that a corporation's freedom to open a store on Sunday
was upheld by a purposive reading of the same phrase, "freedom
115 Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society and Ontario Board of Censors
(1983), 5 D.L.R. (4th) 766 (Ont. C.A.).
116 R. v. Zundel (1987), 56 C.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) (legislation valid); R v.
Keegstra (1988), 43 C.C.C. (3d) 150 (Alta. C.A.) (hate propaganda provisions
invalid), cs. R v. Andrews (1988), 43 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. C.A.).
117 Irwin Toy Ltd v. Attorney-General of Quebec (1986), 32 D.L.R. (4th) 641
(Que. C.A.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted. The tobacco industry is
gearing up to use s.2 arguments so that it will be left free to express itself
in respect of the dangerous drug it sells. While the tobacco industry is
far from popular and will be facing an uphill battle in the courts which
are well aware that the tide is running against the smoking of tobacco,
it has been handed a powerful argument by the Supreme Court of Canada's
decision in Ford v. Attorney General Quebec, supra note 13, to the effect
that commercial speech is protected by s.2. This is one of the inherent
dangers of judicial politics: the rhetoric used as a manipulative tool in
one case is available to quite differently placed persons in another case.
This is inevitable in a forum where class and history, that is, real contexts,
are more often ignored than not. After this lecture was given, the Supreme
Court of Canada handed down its decision in Att. Gen. of Quebec v. Irwin
Toy (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577. Again, commercial expression was held
to be Charter-protected expression. The legislation violating the freedom
of expression was held to be a justifiable violation by the slimmest of
majorities (3:2). This supports the argument made above.
118 At the moment, a union seems to have the upper hand in one such piece
of litigation, see Lavigne v. O.P.S.EU, (1989) 67 O.R. (2d) 536 (C.A.)
but the matter has not been finalized. The Supreme Court of Canada is
yet to speak. Further, the Ontario Court of Appeal decision is based on
the fact that what a union did was a matter of private law. This is both
contentious in law and, more significantly, politically undesirable from a
union's perspective.
119 National Citizens' Coalition Inc. v. A-G Canada (1984), 11 D.L.R. (4th)
481 (Alta. Q.B.).
120 R v. Jones (1986), 69 N.R. 241.
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of religion", by the Supreme Court of Canada?' 2' Or, on yet another
front, neither the workers' right to associate, nor their freedom of
speech when it takes the form of picketing, have been enhanced
by the Charter of Rights.'22
Not only is it hard to see, then, how Canadians' political rights
and freedoms have been enhanced by the courts' readings of s.2,
but the courts' reasoning appears to be incoherent if viewed from
the perspective of Charter proponents and of those who believe
that judges are constrained by some form of internal logic. But,
the results reached are explicable as consistent, purposive readings
if the Charter is not seen as a document whose single purpose it
is to advance rights, in the sense of liberal individual rights, but
rather as being part of a political economy in which the emphasis
is on individualistic rights of the universal, abstract kind as a means
to an end, namely, the maintenance of power by the wealth-owning
members of the private sector. This requires some elaboration.
The rights and freedoms found in s.2 are essentially 18th century
rights, evolving out of the political revolutions in France and the
United States. Up to then, claims of rights had been associated
with specific claims of rights, such as the right to hunt, or to use
land in common, or the right to be awarded "a convenient proportion
of wages". The last phrase comes from the Statute of Apprentices
of Elizabeth I. That statute was very restrictive in that it wanted
to banish idleness and to punish the refusal by workers to work
for masters who needed them. On the other hand, it also guaranteed
a certain amount of income and job security to workers.' 23 From
a contemporary perspective, these rights are likely to be deemed
to be inferior to the abstract rights included in s.2 of the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms because they do not assume, as do the Charter
ones, that all individuals are equal, that all individuals are sovereign
beings. Indeed, these pre-eighteenth century rights assumed the
contrary. But, they were concrete rights.
This simple point has been made to confront an issue of some
importance. Section 2 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms contains
no concrete rights at all. It might have been decided to insert such
rights in it. After all, it is possible to give people both abstract
rights, which reflect our desire to treat all individuals as de jure
equals, and concrete ones, which would help make them actually
equal. This is not such a radical thought for our kind of polity.
For instance, in 1944, President Roosevelt's State of the Union
Message to Congress contained an Economic Bill of Rights. Its
text is worth reproducing in full because it affirms the necessity
of concrete rights to make abstract rights useful:
This Republic had its beginning, and grew to its present strength,
under the protection of certain inalienable political rights - among
121 I refer here to Big M, supra note 37.
122 See, Dolphin, supra note 11, and the right strike cases, supra note 42.
123 1 must reiterate that this part of the presentation is based on E. Hobsbawn,
supra note 113.
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them the right of free speech, free press, free worship, trial by jury,
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. They were our
rights to life and liberty.
As our Nation has grown in size and stature, however - as our
industrial economy expanded - these political rights proved inade-
quate to assure us equality in the pursuit of happiness.
We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual
freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence.
'Necessitous men are not freemen.' People who are hungry and out
of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made.
In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-evident.
We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which
a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all
- regardless of station, race, or creed.
Among these are -
The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries,
or shops or farms or mines of the Nation;
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing
and recreation;
The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a
return which will give him and his family a decent living;
The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in
an atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and dom-
ination by monopolies at home or abroad;
The right of every family to a decent home;
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve
and enjoy good health;
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of
old age, sickness, accident and unemployment;
The right to a good education.
All of these rights spell security. And after this war is won
we must be prepared to move forward, in the implementation
of these rights, to new goals of human happiness and well-
being.' 24 (Emphasis added).
There was no serious suggestion that we should have something
as radical as the 1944 American Economic Bill of Rights during
Canada's constitution-making processes. In fact, the opposite oc-
124 As reported in New York Times, Jan. 12, 1944, 11. It is often noted that
many socialist countries have bills of fights but have terrible records in
respect of what we consider to be important freedoms such as freedom
of speech, freedom of association, and the like, that is, in respect of s.2
kinds of rights. While this appears to be true, it also ought to be noted
that in many of these countries those bill of fights documents also contain
concrete fights, such as a right to a living, a right to a proper retirement
income, a right to a particular level of maternity and paternity benefits,
and the like. For an interesting discussion as to how this has aided to
diminish certain aspects of inequality and discrimination in those countries,
see Gerald A. Home, "Human Rights in United States and Socialist
Constitutional Law and Practice" (1987), Vol. 1 No. 1, Nature, Society
and Thought, 95.
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curred. At the very time that Canadians were being told that they
would be freer than ever before, that the state was eager to give
them more abstract rights and freedoms which would recognize
the sovereignty of individuals and which would protect that sover-
eignty from the oppressive state, that very same state was furiously
engaged in attacking the concrete rights of people, especially those
of disadvantaged ones, which had been won through political
struggles fought over a long time. This is not the place to go into
detail, but, in contemporary Canada, the workers' right to bargain
collectively is being undermined, welfare programmes are under
threat, as are universal education and health programmes. How
can we account for this strange mix of civil libertarian bounty (the
Charter) and economic brutality? Does it have implications for our
understanding of the Charter's enshrinement? Some speculative
offerings follow.
Canada enjoyed a long bout of prosperity in the post-World War
II period. While inequality persisted, a more comfortable living for
more Canadians than ever before was provided. A Keynesian-type
social welfare net had been established by the late 1960's.125 This
provided a degree of satisfaction with existing institutions and
politics. On the whole, the state was fulfilling the contradictory
functions of supporting private property owners' need to accumulate
and the correlative requirement that the state make such accum-
ulation legitimate to non-property owners, very well. But, the long
period of economic success began to end in the 1970's.
Since then, a new scheme of arrangement between capital and
labour has been developing.' 26 The ensuing convulsions have
imposed great suffering on vast sectors of the population. The task
of legitimating this is becoming increasingly difficult. The inherent,
but long dormant, danger that the property-less might use their
voting power to change the nature of the economic restructuring
(which includes state and private attacks on trade unions' and social
welfare recipients' rights and the state's positive support for in-
creasing capital mobility) is brought closer to the surface by these
pressures. In this context, the enshrinement of a liberal document
such as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms can be seen to have
been extremely functional. The argument here is not that the
constitutionalization of abstract rights was part of a coolly thought-
out plan to avoid the difficulties of the surfacing class conflict.
The clamour for a Charter of Rights and Freedoms antedated this
new economic period; moreover, similar enshrinements had taken
place elsewhere, in quite different contexts. Rather, the point is
that the Charter, with the attendant increased judicial review it brings,
125 For an elaboration of the nature of the period of prosperity and of the
development of the social welfare net, see Glasbeek, "Labour Relations
Policy and Law as Mechanisms of Adjustment" (1987), 25 Osgoode Hall
LJ. 179.
126 See Drache and Glasbeek, "The New Fordism - Capital's Offensive;
Labour's Opportunity" (1987), Osgoode Hall LJ. (1987), 27 Osgoode Hall
LJ. 517.
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is extremely functional to help legitimate the ongoing economic
struggle between the Canadian classes. It permits an argument to
be made which, given the prestige of the courts and the fact that
the Charter was sold on the basis that governments are not to be
trusted, has much appeal. This argument is that if people feel bruised
or disadvantaged, there is a political-legal route to take, one which
does not depend on numbers (the one respect in which the property-
less have an advantage in political terms over property owners)
but which relies on rational, objective reasons, which will be listened
to, and adjudicated upon, by unbiased tribunals. The idea is to
reinforce the notion that the problems of the property-less are caused
by an unresponsive and oppressive state which must be curtailed.
To overcome this problem, there is no longer any need to change
the order of things by vote, by force; if something is truly wrong,
courts will fix it bloodlessly. If this deflection of politics can be
achieved, it will be functional from the point of view of the few,
the property owners, as their position will not be subjected as much
as it might be to the vicissitudes of direct and indirect political
struggles in the electoral sphere. Further, the courts can be counted
on to treat the claims of the disadvantaged against the state in
such a way as to bolster the rights of the wealth-owners. It is in
the nature of judiciary as an institution to do this. Let me briefly
support these assertions. The Charter, itself, makes it clear that
the rights and freedoms in it must be claimed against the state. 127
If, as it is argued here, the source of potential political difficulties
for the propertied classes is that, in the one-person, one-vote sphere,
the property-less might force the state to take up the cudgels in
their fight against the property owners if the property owners' power
come to be seen as the cause of the problems of the working classes,
it is extremely useful to have the state identified as the enemy.
127 See s. 32. Despite much of the academic writing to the effect that the
Charter should apply to the conduct of private sector actors, it is clearly
not its intent. The people who have made the argument include: Gibson,
"The Charter of Rights and the Private Sector, (1982/83), 12 Man. LJ
213; Manning - Rights, Freedoms and the Courts (1983); Slattery, "The
Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Does it Bind Private Persons?" (1985),
63 Can. Bar Rev. 148; W.R. Lederman, "Democratic Parliaments, Inde-
pendent Courts and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms," (1985),
11 Queen's LJ i. The best argument that there is for the proposition that
the Charter will apply to the private sector is that the private/public
distinction is, as a matter of abstract logic, impossible to maintain. This
is true. But, the point is that the belief that there is, and ought to be, such
a distinction will enure private sector actors from much of the Charter's
potential applications. As usual, the liberal proponents of the Charter assume
that because an argument is plausible (here that the public and the private
could be seen as points on a spectrum rather than two discrete spheres)
it will be successfully made. Once again, political reality is ignored. While
occasionally the difficulty of maintaining the distinction will cause some
private sector conduct to be subjugated to the Charter's strictures, this will
be the exception, not the rule. But, each and every such isolated decision
will sustain the Charter proponents' optimism for a little while longer.
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In this sense, the Charter is a clear "plus". But, not only are the
courts told by the Charter to accept this as a starting point, their
history and pre-disposition fit them ideally to achieve the goal of
the protection of the wealth-owing classes. It has been their
traditional role to help carve out private property rights, to defend
them and to perpetuate them, as well as the contractual rights allied
with this protection and maintenance of private property. They have
treated the ownership of private property as a natural right.
The question of how it came to be that some people, a very
few, own most of Canada's assets 28, has not been an issue for
the courts. The carving-out and defending of property rights, which
permit some individuals to exclude all others from the benefits of
that property, is not conceived of as public, state-like intervention
with the freedoms and rights of individuals. For the courts, people
either have property rights or not; to have property or not to have
it is a natural attribute of individuals, like having two arms, rather
than one; for judicial purposes their individuality is unaffected. Thus,
in any contractual contest which comes to the courts, say, a dispute
about an employment issue, they have not been concerned with
the fact that one party had far more economic power than the
other when they entered into their binding arrangement. They have
treated the contracting parties as dejure equals, permitting the worst
kinds of oppression. 129 When workers formed trade unions to ensure
some de facto equality, the courts saw their mission plainly: it was
to squash trade unionism.
Thus, moving contentious political issues to the judicial forum,
where the principle of the sacrosanct nature of private property
and of the private-public distinction have been unquestioned for
a couple of centuries, is functional for property owners at this stage
of our economic and political restructuring. The proof is in the
pudding. When a case comes to the courts which leaves no doubt
whatsoever that private property and contract rights are under attack,
typically when collective labour confronts capital directly, our courts
have read the Charter very purposively, if its real purpose is defined
as it is in this part of the argument. This explains the importance
placed on the maintenance of the private/public distinction in
Dolphin.130 It explains why, in the right to strike cases, the judges
saw no difficulty in holding the line where they did. The courts
had never accepted the right to strike. Changes in the world, arising
out of the state's need to mediate fierce capital-labour conflicts,
had forced them to accept it as permissible conduct (contrast:
128 Osberg, Economic Inequality in Canada (1981), has shown that the richest
10% of Canadians own 57% of Canada's total personal wealth, while the
poorest 40% of Canadians own 1% of Canada's total personal wealth.
129 For a discussion of this see Glasbeek, "Law; Real and Ideological Constraints
on the Working Class" in Gibson & Baldwin (eds.), Law in a Cynical Society?
Opinion and Law in the 1980's (1985) 282; "The Contract of Employment
at Common Law" in Anderson & Gunderson (eds.), Union - Management
Relations in Canada (1982), 42.
130 Supra note 11.
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conduct which is an inviolable right) in limited circumstances. If
a legislature wishes to take away the "permit" it has granted, the
courts can be relied upon to support it.
Another way of looking at the functionality of the enshrinement
of the Charter is by taking a glance at a cherished aspect of the
Charter proponents' argument. The Charter, and particularly its s.
2 provisions (as well as the rights found in section 15), is seen
as the way by which minorities can assert their now universalized
rights and freedoms. The proponents of this argument do not seem
to have much doubt as to what a list of minorities would look
like. It would include the racially, ethnically and nationally different,
differently-abled persons, the old, the young, women as a gender,
or single and/or aged women, single mothers, the unemployed,
welfare recipients, and so forth. While it is manifest that racial,
ethnic, gender and age differences, create differences in attitudes,
hopes and aspirations in their own right 31 , it is possible that these
differences are not as important as are the attitudes, hopes and
aspirations which are shared as goals and needs by these groups.
There is a considerable body of sociological literature which supports
this possibility. Breton's work, for instance, shows that when two
social classes are in conflict and one is fairly ethnically or racially
homogeneous and the other is not, ethnicity or race will work to
the advantage of the former. 132
In Canada this means that the anglo-saxon property-owning
classes will be advantaged. The working classes will tend to be
divided between those who belong to the same group as the
employing one, that is, anglo-saxon or British, and other groupings.
The anglo-saxon workers' exploitation will not be as marked as
those of a different racial or ethnic background. This gives them
a reason to have a discriminatory attitude towards new immigrants.
Amongst the latter, each separate group may have similar reasons
for resisting new migrants of a particular type, as each of these
exploited groups' job security and incomes will be more or less
threatened by new competition of certain types of immigrants. That
is, the dominant economic group, employers, does not have to be
racially or ethnically discriminatory or sexist. The system will work
for it: workers will become, more or less, sexist, xenophobic or
racist. ' 33
131 See G. Arrighi, "Marxism and the 'Fact of Conquest"', The African Rev.
6:17-33 (1976); E. Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxists' Theory (London:
NLB, 1977); C. Leys, J. Saul, E. Laclau, Populism and Popular Ideologies
(1980).
132 R. Breton, "Ethnic Stratification Viewed from Three Theoretical Per-
spectives," in J. Curtis and W. Scott (eds.), Social Stratification: Canada
(1979), 270.
113 Filson, "Class and Ethnic Differences in Canadians' Attitudes to Native
People's Rights and Immigration" (1983), 20 Canadian Rev. of Society and
Anthropology (4). Filson shows, for instance, how farmers' antipathy towards
native groups is far greater than that of working class people of all kinds.
The latter clearly do not feel threatened by affirmative action for native
peoples. A majority of working class people support it; the farmers do
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In short, if the minorities are constituted, at least in large part,
to serve the existing economic system, then, inasmuch as they are
disadvantaged in our society, the best way to overcome their
problems would be to use tactics which diminish the significance
of these economically imposed distinctions. Such a politics of
coalition would emphasize that the so-called minorities constitute
a majority; electoral politics, then, would become a very potent
weapon, precisely because the wealth-owners are the real minority
in our society) 34 This is hardly a revelation. In 1865, John A.
MacDonald wrote:
The rights of the minority must be protected, and the rich are always
fewer in number than the poor. 35
The means to coalesce the so-called minorities into a politically
effective majority are not readily at hand. Material conditions have
grouped them into antagonistic fragments. It is clear, therefore, that
the institutional politics of the Charter, which requires them to make
appeals as discrete, often opposed, interest groups and which
identifies the state as the instrument of their oppression, rather than
the private owners of wealth, will make it more difficult to overcome
the barrier to coalition politics.
In addition, a major negative feature of the concentration on
the legal rather than the political is that it detracts from the militance
of the disadvantaged and from the possibility of creating solidarity
movements. In particular, to get the state to act on your behalf
against private power or to pressure the private sector directly,
requires grassroot organization. Above all, numbers are needed.
The greater the number and variety of participants the better. The
contrary is true of legal politics. It is conducted via technocratic
representation, i.e. lawyers, who only demand fund-raising from
their clientele, not advice, not meetings, marches or votes. A victory
in the courts may still leave a broke and apathetic rump organization
behind, one not capable of moving forward any further. And victories
are rare. It is sometimes thought that a defeat in the courts may
help fuel political organization. This is a roundabout and costly
way of creating a militant political grouping. Thus, while the Charter
and judicial review are not essential to advanced capitalism's needs,
they are certainly functional in helping maintain the inequality on
which capitalism thrives.
not. Filson draws out many such examples of differential attitudes relating
to immigration and to racial characteristics. The bottom line is that the
economic basics play a major, probably a determinative, role in creating
positive or negative attitudes towards people of different groupings. The
differences inherent in characteristics, such as ethnicity, race and gender
are not paramount, although they do have some significance in their own
right.
134 Osberg, supra note 128.
135 As cited in Walter Stewart, But Not in Canada' (1983), 76. This may go
a long way towards explaining why so many lawyers and intellectuals who
serve this minority, and more often than not, belong to it, are such fierce
proponents and sellers of the Charter. While I do not doubt their sincerity,
it is unquestionably bolstered by their material interest.
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(d) Equality Rights
The inclusion of section 15 (and of section 28) in the Charter
is, perhaps, the most hopeful aspect of the constitutionalization of
Canadians' rights and freedoms. This is so because it suggests that
inequality will no longer be tolerated in Canada. This might be
the best answer to the argument made herein to the effect that
the Charter, as a classic liberal document, cannot deliver a truly
democratic society. After all, once something like true economic
equality is achieved (i), access to the courts will be more equally
available to all who feel oppressed by the state and (ii), the state
will no longer feel the need to favour one group rather than any
other, because no one group will be in a better position than any
other to bully the state by threatening to withdraw its economic
support for the state. This vision of a society where something like
real economic equality would ensure a truly free society is not a
novel one. Thomas Morel 36 advocated it as, of course, do Marxists.
More pertinently it was thought to be the basis of republican
democracy and government by the likes of Benjamin Franklin,
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.' 37 De Tocqueville 138 rec-
ognized that equality of condition, as opposed to equality of
opportunity, was a necessary condition for democracy because it
made possible the love of independence which individuals needed
to make democracy work, because it eliminated the natural con-
sequence of inequality, namely, that the rich should rule society
for their own benefit, and because it is only when there is relative
economic equality that everyone's property is safe and there is no
longer any need for the rich to coerce the poor people, nor is there
any continued need for the poor to revolt against the rich. It is
well understood, then, that something like real democracy is more
possible when equality of economic conditions prevails. Arguably
section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms suggests that it
136 In his Utopia (1973) 46-47, More wrote: "I don't see how you can ever
get any real justice or prosperity so long as there is private property, and
everything is judged in terms of money-unless you consider it just for
the worst people to have the best living conditions, or unless you are prepared
to call a country prosperous in which all the wealth is owned by a tiny
minority ... while everyone else is simply miserable." In a similar vein,
The Episcopal Commission for Social Affairs for the Canadian Conference
of Catholic Bishops wrote in their Ethical Reflections on the Economic Crisis
(1984): "These patterns of domination and inequality are likely to further
intensify as the "survival of the fittest" doctrine is applied more rigorously
to the economic order. While these theories partly explain the rules that
govern the animal world, they are in our view morally unacceptable as
a "rule of life" for the human community."
137 D.R. McCoy, "Benjamin Franklin's Vision of a Republican Political
Economy for America," William and Mary Quarterly, October 1973, 605;
see also his The Elusive Republic (1980); Philip S. Foner (ed.), The Basic
Writings of Thomas Jefferson (1944); Foner, The Democratic-Republican
Societies: 1790-1800 (1976); Richard K. Matthews, The Radical Politics
of Thomas Jefferson (1984).
138 Democracy in America (1954).
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was this kind of world to which our constitution-makers aspired
in 1981-82.
At this juncture, it is of some interest to point out that the section
with this potential was the result of the only real democratic
participation by people who felt disadvantaged in the constitution-
making process, namely, women. The story of the mass organization
political efforts made by women to get male politicians to understand
the need for better treatment of disadvantaged groups, such as
women, is well-known. 139 Indeed, part of the impetus for this political
agitation was the Supreme Court of Canada's particularly callous
treatment of women in two famous cases, Bliss and Lavell' 40 . Pal
and Morton14' have argued that women, faced with these disasters,
realized that neither the existing Bill of Rights, nor judicial inter-
pretation of the common law, could be counted on to help them
achieve their goals. This motivated them to get the kind of provision
that eventually was embodied in section 15. By then, it was clear
to one and all that women really had been scandalously treated
by the courts. This helped politicians accept the need for such a
section. If nothing else, this was a clear demonstration that when
so-called minority groups decide to pool their resources they have
a great deal of political leverage, something which tends to be
forgotten when arguments are made that minorities are inevitably
fragmented, have contradictory interests and can never be served
very well by the political process. This point is made here to
underscore the argument made in the previous section.
The early interpretation of section 15 did not yield anything like
the outcomes hoped for by its proponents. In particular, the courts
overwhelmingly read section 15 in a formalistic manner, that is,
in a manner which was congruent with liberal notions of equality.
This meant that anyone who complained of a distinction would
have a right to come forward. As much of the law in existence
which overtly distinguished between groups in this way tended to
benefit disadvantaged groups, miserly as these benefits might have
been, judicial open season was declared on these schemes. Petter 42
has noted that, very often, precisely the "wrong" kind of people
were able to use the Charter. He shows that, in age discrimination
cases, the applicants were usually people who opposed mandatory
retirement because they were well-situated professional types,
whereas the vast bulk of the population, workers and would-be
entrants into the paid workforce, benefit from mandatory retirement
schemes. He further records that, at the time of writing, "of the
first thirty-five sex discrimination cases.. . twenty-five - over 70%
- ... [were] brought by male plaintiffs. Of the eleven cases in
139 K. Banting & R. Simeon (ed.), And No One Cheered (1983).
140 Bliss v. Attorney General of Canada, [ 1979] 1 S.C.R. 183; Attorney-General
of Canada v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349.
14 Bliss v. Attorney General of Canada: "From Legal Defeat to Actual Victory"
(1986), 24 Osgoode Hall Law J 141.
142 Andrew Petter, "Legitimizing Sexual Inequality: The Early Charter Cases"
(1989), 34 McGil LJ. 358.
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which sexual equality claims .. . succeeded, seven ... over 65%
... involved male claimants". 43 In addition, it is important to
remember that people who get a s.15 decision in their favour, do
not necessarily obtain a positive result. The legislature may react
by eliminating or changing the benefit scheme which gave rise to
the "discrimination". The court winners may still get nothing; worse,
so may the formerly assisted disadvantaged minority group.
144
Because the courts were prepared to give standing to such
formalistic views of equality, all sorts of people and groups were
able to make claims, including the corporate sector, although, in
the end, these kinds of claims did not succeed very well. 145 Women,
who were hoping for so much from the introduction of section
15, did not gain very much at all. In addition to some of the losses
143 Some of these perverse decisions are: Attorney General of Nova Scotia v.
Phillips (1986), 34 D.L.R. (4th) 633 and Reference Re Family Benefits Act
(N.S.), Section 5 (1986) 75 N.S.R. (2d) 338, (benefits for poor women
offended s. 15 because men did not get them); Shewchuk v. Ricard (1986),
24 C.R.R. 45 (differentiation between natural mothers and fathers offended
s.15 but saved by s.l); Re McVicar and Superintendent of Family and Child
Services, [1987] 3 W.W.R. 176 (s.15 requires that a natural father's, as
well as a natural mother's, consent be obtained by adopting parents, no
matter how impractical this is). For a full discussion of these and like
cases, see Petter, supra note 142 and J. Fudge, "The Public/Private
Distinction: The Possibilities of and the Limits to the Use of Charter Litigation
to Further Feminist Struggles" (1987), 25 Osgoode Hall LJ. 485.
144 See Silano v. B.C. (Govt.), [1987] 5 W.W.R. 739 (B.C.S.C.); Shacter v. The
Queen (1988), 88 C.L.L.C. 14,021 (Ont. H. Ct.) was hailed as a victory
by many women activist lawyers. But, in that case, the court said that,
while it would like to see an advantage given by the statute to adopted
parents' extended to natural parents, thereby avoiding the discrimination
found to exist under the legislative scheme, it accepted the fact that the
government might very well decide to eliminate the benefit for all parents,
or diminish the benefit entitlement of adoptive parents so that it became
equal to that created for natural parents, or to fashion a compromise
somewhere in between. This emphasizes one of the difficulties of having
Charter victories translated into concrete gains: someone must still allocate
some public expenditure to a disadvantaged group; courts do not do that.
145 See, eg., Re Aluminium Company of Canada Ltd and the Queen (1986),
29 D.L.R. (4th) 429. One of the most dangerous attacks of this kind has
been on the workers' compensation schemes which pre-empt torts' actions.
For nearly the whole of this century workers' compensation has served
workers relatively well, well that is in comparison to the anti-workers'
torts' system which pre-existed it. In recent times, lawyers, who think of
themselves as progressive actors (Beatty and Kopyto), have sought to bring
actions arguing that the equality provisions of the Charter make the lack
of access to the courts by workers injured in the workplace unconstitutional.
So far they seem to be failing, but it is not for want of trying; Reference
Re Workers' Compensation Act (Nfld) (1988), 67 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 16 (Nfld.
C.A.). Since this was written, the Supreme Court of Canada has upheld
the validity of the pre-emptive nature of workers' compensation legislation;
Re Workers' Compensation Act 1983 (Nfld.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 922.
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they suffered in respect of family benefits they had obtained and
having to fight actions to protect what, as disadvantaged people,
they had won, they lost ground in relation to protective legislation
which, after much struggle, had been passed to protect women in
sexual violence or victimization cases, because courts would not.146
It is not surprising, therefore, that when Morgentaler was handed
down it was seen as an absolute triumph, even though it did not
guarantee any positive concrete outcome. 47
At this stage, the results of s. 15 litigation were depressing. This
was all the more true because, in order to try to make winning
arguments, disadvantaged groups, such as women, frequently had
to make arguments which were antithetical to their ultimate goals.
Thus, in the case of Tomen 148, women teachers made an argument
that an all female trade union in the educational system was justified
because women had suffered from systemic discrimination and
needed to exercise solidarity to overcome the effects of this long-
lasting discrimination. This argument of principle is vital to people
seeking equality. Unfortunately, to win the case, the female union
also had to rely on the argument that the Charter should not apply
to it because its association was a private, contractual one and,
therefore, not subject to the Charter. As it is the maintenance of
the private/public distinction which has led to much of the difficulties
created for women (as well as those of other non-propertied minority
groups for different reasons), the position forced upon the female
teachers in this case, and the one accepted by the court as
determinative of the issue before it, was hardly progressive. 49
146 The infamous decision, Re Seaboyer and the Queen," Re Gayme and the
Queen (1987), 61 O.R. (2d) 290 (C.A.), is the low mark of decision-making
in this area; see J. Fudge, supra note 143. For a good and hard-hitting
analysis of social welfare cases, some of which have been discussed as
equality cases in the text, see R.A. Hasson supra note 68.
141 R v. Morgentaler (1988), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.). A year after the
case there are troubling reports as to the apparent failure of the decision
to being about much by way of improved access to abortion; see Toronto
Star, Jan. 28, 1989, A4. Moreover, as noted, supra note 108, the useful
symbolic aspect of the decision may be lost yet, should the legislature decide
to criminalize abortions, even to a small extent. This case is a good illustration
of the argument that a 'victory' in the courts does not translate into a
positive programme for the 'winners' without more.
148 Re Tomen and Federation of Women Teachers'Association of Ontario (1987),
61 O.R. (2d) 489 (Ont. H. Ct.).
149 For the importance of the distinction of public and private to the continued
discrimination against women see J. Fudge supra note 143 and the literature
cited there. A similar argument was forced upon the unions in the Lavigne
case where, in part, the union was forced to make the argument that the
selling of labour for the purposes of entering into collective agreements
was the same kind of activity as that of the buying and selling of paper
clips. At the Court of Appeal level, where the union won, Lavigne v. O.P.S.EU.
supra note 118, it was held that it should win because what trade unions
did, as a matter of fund-raising, was a matter subject to private contractual
arrangements, not a concern of public interest law. This ignores the history
and class position of workers. As noted earlier, the idea that private contract-
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In February of 1989, however, the Supreme Court of Canada
handed down its decision in Andrews.'50 That decision has already
attracted much attention. It has made it clear that a formalistic
way of looking at section 15 is no longer to be tolerated by the
courts. The Supreme Court of Canada accepted the argument made
by LEAF which had intervened in the case. In brief, that argument
was that the unequal treatment of equals could lead to the per-
petuation of inequality. But, while the language found in the decision
is welcome, it is by no means certain that the decision will yield
the kinds of results that will help disadvantaged Canadians because
s. 15 will become the touchstone which, finally, will make Charter
proponents feel and look good. The major holdings of the Supreme
Court of Canada were:
(i) The grounds enumerated in s. 15 are not to be the only proscribed
grounds of discrimination which will lead to a finding that there
has been a violation of s. 15. The ambit of protection is to be extended
to include grounds of an analogous nature. What this will mean
is not yet clear. The Court indicated that discrimination based solely
on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the
strictures of s.15, especially if the distinction resembled one of the
explicitly forbidden ones in s. 15. Thus, in Andrews itself, citizenship
being a personal characteristic, not unlike that of race, was to be
heeded as a proscribed ground of discrimination just like it. The
Court hinted that it might even go beyond such clearly analogous
situations, but, in typical judicial fashion, gave no inkling how far
they, as judges, would be willing to go. The Supreme Court of
Canada did say, however, that it would not be right to extend s.15
so that all dissimilar treatment of individuals would be considered
offensive discrimination. Leaving aside the vagueness of the reason-
ing, the willingness to restrict s.15 to analogous situations to the
ones listed is a positive aspect of this decision. It ought to eliminate
the claims to equality (or make them much more difficult) made
by corporations such as Alcan' 5' and arguments such as that the
failure to give workers access to the courts to sue in torts is an
invidious form of discrimination. So far, so good; some of the damage
done by s. 15 might be prevented in the future.
(ii) The courts are no longer to be satisfied if the law treats similarly
situated people alike. 52 Rather, the courts are to determine whether
making is not a prime cause of inequality and oppression is detrimental
to the working classes. Tomen is on appeal and may be reversed. But,
the fact that the public/private dichotomy persists will not be, only whether
or not the line was properly drawn in this case. The same argument applies
to Lavigne.
150 Supra note 43.
151 Supra note 145.
152 The same treatment of all Indians, or of all women, will not mean that
the treatment is not discriminatory. It should be instructive for Charter
proponents to note how long it has taken courts to understand what the
rest of the world has understood for years, namely that neither the results
in Bliss or Lavell supra note 140, are tolerable to our community. Indeed,
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the socio-economic context in which s. 15 applicants find themselves
causes them to be disadvantaged by equal treatment because they
start from an unequal base. The claimants will not have to show
that the law is specifically aimed to hurt them. The crucial question
is how a court is to decide whether or not such systemic discrim-
ination exists. McIntyre J. gave a good indication as to how this
is to be done. He tells us how it is that systemic discrimination
came to be in a free and democratic society such as Canada:
Discrimination as referred to in section 15 of the Charter must be
understood in the context of pre- Charter history.... With the steady
increase in population from the earliest days of European emigration
into Canada with the consequential growth of industry, agriculture
and commerce and the vast increase in national wealth which
followed, many social problems developed. The contact of the
European immigrant with the indigenous population, the steady
increase in immigration bringing those of neither French nor British
background, and in more recent years the greatly expanded role
of women in all forms of industrial, commercial and professional
activity led to much inequality and many forms of discrimination.(p. 16 of advance sheets of this judgment). 5 3
McIntyre J. implicitly places primary responsibility for systemic
discrimination on the private ordering system, on the market. He
notes that the relatively recent Human Rights Codes were designed
to offset the continuing and more overt forms of discriminatory
practices engaged in by private actors. He also points out that these
Codes have been ineffective, and are likely to remain so, because
they all have created exemptions or defences, including the bona
fide occupational requirement one, which "have the effect of
completely removing the conduct complained of from the reach
of the Act" (p.17 5 -7 6 ). McIntyre J. clearly sees these Codes as
the mechanism, inefficient though it is, by which to address private
sector discrimination and its effects. Section 15 of the Charter is
to be available for use when incidents of discrimination are alleged
by people who can show that they are the victims of systemic
discrimination because the world of private ordering has made them
so. Only where a governmental law (or decision - this is unclear)
perpetuates this. The mere fact of systemic discrimination is not,
a priori, the basis for a s. 15 action: the state must have exacerbated,
it or caused it. It is important to note that all members of the Court,
including members of the the so-called progressive wing, expressed
their total agreement with McIntyre J.'s reasoning.
In sum, the Supreme Court of Canada has understood that it
must forego an interpretation of equality which is formalistic in
McIntyre J. spends a good deal of time denouncing these decisions. As
usual, I expect Charter supporters to point to the judicial social conscience
exhibited in these passages. Yet, legislation largely had overcome the Bliss
and Lavell problems well before Andrews was decided. That is, while the
language of tolerance and understanding is welcome, the court was not
being too radical, too daring, when it used it.
153 Supra note 43, 172.
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nature only. Nonetheless, it retains its strong adherence to the public/
private distinction which it has espoused in other areas of inter-
pretation of the Charter, such as in the s.2 cases discussed earlier
in this paper. It is likely that, for quite a long time yet, the private
ordering system will be left alone, even though it is the, or at least
the most, significant cause of inequality in our society. This tells
us a lot about the nature of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
as interpreted by the courts. In concrete terms, it is difficult to
see how much progress is offered by the Andrews holding. There
will be some, but probably not that many, cases where legislation
or regulations, by purporting to apply equally to people who are
unequally situated, will be found to violate s.15. But, note that,
even if such legislation is found to be discriminatory, this does
not necessarily mean that benefits will enure to the victors in such
a case. After all, the disadvantaged group may get a court to hold
that there was a violation of section 15(1) but find that the court
believes that the discrimination is a justifiable limitation in a free
and democratic society. It is important to note that, in Andrews
itself, McIntyre J. came to the opposite view to that of his colleagues
on just this point,even though they agreed with his principled
reasoning. Secondly, to win a case, that is to have a piece of
legislation or regulation held to be discriminatory under s. 15(1),
does not mean that the government or the executive will take the
appropriate action to make sure that the disadvantaged get the
benefit that they were seeking. Further, it is to be remembered
that much law which is overtly discriminatory is so because it seeks
to confer a benefit on poorly placed people. What Andrews does
offer, is that, in the future, statutes which do confer such a benefit,
such as legislation providing specifically for single mothers, pregnant
women, or adoptive parents, will no longer be the subject of
successful challenges by single fathers, male parents or natural
parents who are jealous of adoptive ones. That is, it is likely that
Andrews' most progressive impact will be that it might enure from
attack those legislative schemes which benefit minority groups and
which, in pre-Charter days, were never challengeable.154
154 One interesting possibility is that it might be argued that when systemic
discrimination caused by private actors is not overcome by reliance on
Human Rights Codes, that it is those governmental laws which are a cause
of it. Something like this argument surfaced in Re Blainey and Ontario
Hockey Association (1986), 26 D.LR (4th) 728 (Ont. C.A.). It is typical
of the form of argument forced on people by the Charter that this is a
plausible line of reasoning: progressive legislation is to be characterized
as reactionary. In any event, the reason Human Rights Codes might have
this effect, as noted by McIntyre J., in Andrews, is that they provide far
too many defences. Those defences likely will appeal to courts, given the
Supreme Court of Canada's expressed view in Andrews that "merit" is
always a permissible ground of discrimination. "Merit" is based on economic
rationality, as are most of the defences and exemptions in the Human Rights
Codes. This will make it easy to use s.1 to save discriminatory practices
should this line of argument be advanced.
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IV. Summation
Much effort has been invested in portraying, and having the courts
treat, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as an ideal instrument
by which to guarantee an increased respect for the rights and
sovereignty of individuals against the actions of a potentially
oppressive state. In this paper I have not been able to prove that
the Charter and judicial review cannot lead to the achievement
of these goals. It is a plausible line of argument and, occasionally,
there is a decision or judicial language which bolsters it. But, overall,
the judicial record does not support the argument. To the contrary.
This is so because, in order to make the argument, its proponents
have had to rely on some shaky assumptions about the need for
the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the
nature of judicial decision-making. In particular, the politics sur-
rounding the entrenchment process have not been given the weight
it ought to be. Nor has the role of the judiciary in the development
of a capitalist economy which requires the protection of private
property and private contract-making, been taken into account. Its
historic support for private market power has made the judiciary
a key player in contributing to the maintenance of a society of
haves and have-nots, a society in which the have-nots are fragmented
into competing groups.
By contrast, a no-frills' approach places heavy emphasis on these
aspects of the constitutionalization of liberal rights and freedoms.
Such an approach, while it cannot predict with certainty how the
Charter will be interpreted in the future, does provide a framework
within which the results yielded so far can be said to have been
not unexpected. To explain them there is no need to resort to some
of the sophisticated, abstract rationalizations which some of the
Charter proponents use. Nor is there a need to mount an argument
which acknowledges that things have gone awry thus far but that,
eventually, when courts come to terms with what the Charter is
really all about, we will get a perfection of the rights and freedoms
which Charter proponents believe the enshrinement of that document
was meant to achieve. This seems somewhat romantic. Further,
to those who use a no-frills approach, the large scale displacement
of contentious issues, which arise out of the massive inequality in
Canadian society and out of the class-related fragmentation of
Canadians, from the more directly (if deficient) participatory dem-
ocratic institutions to another branch of the state whose particular
role it has been to help create and maintain inequality and frag-
mentation, is not likely to lead to the alleviation of these problems.
Yet such amelioration is required to develop a society which truly
respects rights and freedoms and democracy. To shift much of that
important task to a judiciary armed with the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms is a step in precisely the wrong direction.
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